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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT 
 
 This report presents the findings of a documentary project on 
the lives of miners and others working in the artisanal mining industry 
in select sites in North Kivu and South Kivu in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). This work is part of a larger project 
known as the Initiative to Enhance Worker Rights in the Kivus 
(RITEWORK) managed by Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and 
Human Rights (HA), which is known in the DRC as Kazisafi.1 This 
element of the project was designed by a faculty member at Arizona 
State University associated with the Center for Law and Global Affairs 
at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and the School of Politics 
and Global Studies.2   
The Kazisafi/RITEWORK project is a two-year initiative 
funded by the United States Department of State’s Bureau for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor designed to strengthen respect 
for worker rights in the mining industry in regions of North Kivu and 
South Kivu. The larger project links the work detailed here – the 
collection and analysis of information on the lives of miners and others 
working in the industry and their experiences of human rights violations 
– with a set of service and capacity building activities.  
These activities were developed and implemented in 
coordination with three Congolese civil society organizations: Association 
des Jeunes pour le Développement Intégré-Kalundu (AJEDIKA); Bureau d’Etudes 
Scientifiques et Technique (BEST); and Arche d’Alliance (ARAL).3 The work 
was managed out of HA offices in Bukavu and Uvira (linked to the 
group’s regional headquarters in Bujumbura, Burundi) and integrated 
with local partners’ contacts and social networks. The project’s 
                                                          
1  In Swahili, “kazi” means “work” and “safi” means “cool” in the sense 
of “good”, “positive” and “fair” so this means “Decent Work”, “Good 
Work” or “Quality Work”. 
2 The Principal Investigator (PI) for the project is Daniel Rothenberg 
who is Professor of Practice and Lincoln Fellow for Ethics and 
International Human Rights Law, as well as founding executive director 
of the Center for Law and Global Affairs. He teaches in the School of 
Politics and Global Studies and the Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law. 
3 The three partners were selected through a mapping exercise of local 
actors in the region and significant HA consultation with community 
experts and others. The selection criteria leading to the decision to work 
with these groups was then based on: an assessment of relevant core 
expertise and background in advancing labor rights; past experience in 
advocacy, outreach, and socio-economic support; capacity to manage 
project activities and perform monitoring and evaluation; and positive 
references from previous partners and others. 
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fieldwork and activities focus primarily on six mining sites in the region 
including Katogota, Lemera, Mukela, Mukungwe, Nyabibwe and 
Nzibira (detailed descriptions of these sites can be found in section 
four). 
The overall goal of the Kazisafi/RITEWORK project is to build 
local capacity, create positive and productive paths for miners and 
others seeking to leave the industry, and develop strategies for a more 
protective artisanal mining industry premised on respect for the 
fundamental rights of the Congolese people. During its two years of 
operation, the project conducted outreach to over 6,000 workers, 
offered alternative livelihood training and various income-generating 
options, such as carpentry and tailoring, to over 1,200 workers, and 
provided multiple educational and training services.  
The documentation component of the project detailed in this 
report focuses on improving the quality of locally-led, focused, context-
sensitive data collection and analysis. To do this, the project team 
gathered data using two distinct methods. First, HA staff and local 
partners collected data on case studies of alleged human rights and labor 
law violations in the six field sites. Second, the project team collected 
oral histories from miners, porters, washers and others working in the 
mines. In addition, a small number of oral histories were collected from 
crew bosses, mine bosses, mine police and government officials.  
The goal of the documentary initiative is to better understand 
the lived experience of miners and others as a means of informing 
effective policy. Through a careful review of how miners understand 
their experiences, it is then possible to develop context sensitive 
methods of improving workers’ lives, increasing safety and other 
protections, preventing ongoing violations, and developing sustainable 
mechanisms for minimizing the impunity that characterizes extractive 
industries in the eastern DRC.  
These are complex and difficult goals and the challenges of the 
artisanal mining industry do not have easy solutions. With this in mind, 
this project introduces some useful data on the lives of miners and 
others and uses this material to craft a set of recommendations. The 
study does not pretend to answer the many difficult questions facing 
artisanal mining in the eastern DRC, but rather seeks to contribute to 
the rather impressive literature on the industry, providing additional 
material of value for engaging the multiple existing domestic and 
international programs in this area. 
This project focuses on understanding violations within the 
artisanal mining industry from the perspective of miners and others 
working in the mines such as porters and washers. This perspective 
involves at least two elements. First, there is the question of how the 
experiences of people involved in artisanal mining represent human 
rights violations and other formal violations of the law. That is, to what 
degree can what these individuals live through be analyzed from the 
perspectives of international and domestic law? Second, it is important 
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to listen to the miners, porters and others about what is most troubling 
about their own experiences of the industry. There is not always a 
perfect overlap between these two issues. For example, there are 
multiple violations of the DRC mining code – tunnels that exceed the 
mandated depth, the failure to engage in environmental impact reviews, 
the registration of all artisanal miners with miners cards, etc. – that 
appear to be of limited relevance to those working in mines (even if 
adherence to these rules might provide real benefits to workers). And, 
there are other actions, such as insults, mistreatment and forms of 
systematic humiliation that are not illegal, yet leave miners angry, breed 
conflict, define their disempowerment and are, thus, characteristic of 
the industry.  
Examination from this perspective illuminates important points 
that should inform work intended to improve rights protection and 
regulation in artisanal mining in the eastern DRC. Perhaps what is most 
interesting and significant is the fact that the structure of the artisanal 
mining industry and its inherently repressive and ill-regulated nature 
cannot be fully understood through a legal analysis of rights, whether 
grounded in the broader protective vision of human rights or as bound 
to the specifics of mining related laws and regulations. In part, this is 
because miners and other workers in the industry have limited direct 
engagement with what is a violation of the law and what is not. This 
should change and with it should come mechanisms to ensure greater 
legal protections.  
Because so many aspects of the artisanal mining industry violate 
multiple domestic and international laws, there is little value in 
enumerating all of the violations found in the industry. Similarly, it is 
not especially useful to outline in a point by point manner the full array 
of systematically repressive conditions that represent legal problems 
based on the multiple applicable domestic and international laws. Yet, as 
they respond to the daily challenges of working in the artisanal mining 
industry, Congolese seek to use the tools they have to minimize their 
risks and maximize their benefits. Miners and others direct their 
sensitivity and intelligence towards navigating work in a difficult and 
dangerous industry that offers multiple advantages alongside significant 
brutality and abuse.  
While many aspects of the system operate to disempower 
miners and others working in the industry, there are multiple cases in 
which workers seek to mitigate dangers and improve their lives. Some 
mine crews are tightly knit and display a substantial cooperative spirit. 
Miners commonly pool their resources, assist each other in hard times 
and work jointly to aid those injured or ill. At times, they present a 
united front in the face of various authorities, but in general those with 
power use their position to exert violence and control over workers.  
Artisanal mining is essential to the economies of North and 
South Kivu and is a key component of the lives of hundreds of 
thousands if not millions of Congolese. With this in mind, it is not 
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ultimately useful to reduce the industry to a catalogue of violations or to 
focus only on the very real abuses that characterize the extraction of 
minerals from the region without an adequate grounding in context. 
That is, a review of acts of violence and abuse alone provides minimal 
understanding of what is really going on and, with it, an inadequate 
capacity to develop meaningful policy responses.  
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2. ARTISANAL MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS4 
 
a) Artisanal mining in North Kivu and South Kivu 
 
The DRC’s enormous mineral wealth has long been heralded as 
a ‘geological scandal’, and includes important deposits of copper, cobalt, 
tin, tantalum, gold and diamonds (World Bank, 2010a). Eager to 
capitalize on this wealth, the Belgian colonial administration rapidly 
established and developed industrial, large-scale mining (LSM) during 
the first half of the twentieth century. 
Yet the productive capacity of LSM was too slow and it 
eventually declined following independence and the nationalization of 
the colonial mining companies under President Mobutu. A combination 
of economic mismanagement, deteriorating infrastructure and external 
shocks (including the two Shaba wars, the closure of export routes to 
Angola, and price fluctuations on the world market) led to a rapid drop 
in industrial production from the 1970s onwards, falling close to zero by 
the mid-1990s.  
During the same period, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), 
termed “artisanal mining” in this report, activity soared following its 
legalization in 1983. At the time, President Mobutu liberalized the sector 
to allow Congolese citizens to directly exploit and trade in minerals as a 
way to ‘fend for themselves’ during a time of economic hardship. 
Today, there is only one active industrial mining operation in the whole 
of North and South Kivu (in production since November 2011); the 
Twangiza gold mine, owned by the Canada-based multinational Banro 
(Geenen & Claessens, 2012). This one gold mine aside, all mineral 
production in the Kivu provinces occurs through artisanal mining.    
The most recent audit report from the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative for the year 2010 highlighted that in 2008 and 
2009 the mineral trade from the Kivu provinces contributed over $17 
million to the state budget (ITIE-RDC, 2012). Given the vast amount 
of minerals smuggled out of the Kivu provinces with no contribution to 
the state budget, the real value of minerals produced in the region is, 
while difficult to quantify, significantly higher. For example, there are 
approximately 900 mining sites across the Kivu provinces.5 In addition, 
a recent report estimated three artisanal gold mining sites alone 
contribute $14 million per month to the local economy (Kamundala 
Byemba 2012: 13). 
                                                          
4 Ben Radley, has written extensively on this topic in: Geenen & Radley, 
‘In the face of reform, what future for ASM in the eastern DRC?’, Futures 54 
(2013). Some of the content in Sections 1. and 2.d) is reproduced from 
this article, with the permission of the article’s co-author, Sara Geenen. 
5 Interview by team member Ben Radley with Ministry of Mines official, 
Bukavu, June 14, 2013. 
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There are a wide range of minerals mined in North Kivu and 
South Kivu including: gold; niobium; tantalite; cassiterite; beryl; 
tungsten; monzonite; platinum; sapphire; diamond; tourmaline; 
amethyst; quartz; and semi-precious gemstones (Pact, 2010). With the 
exception of Banro’s industrial exploitation in South Kivu, all mining 
conducted in the Kivu provinces involves artisanal mining.  
Artisanal mining broadly refers to mining practiced by 
individuals or communities on a non-industrial scale, using basic tools 
and equipment. In the 2002 DRC Mining Code, artisanal mining is 
defined as:  
 
any activity by means of which a person of Congolese 
nationality carries out extraction and concentration of 
mineral substances using artisanal tools, methods and 
processes, within an artisanal exploitation area limited in 
terms of surface.6  
 
While there is no singular international definition of artisanal 
mining and there are significant differences in techniques used around 
the world, some key features can be identified. Artisanal mining 
involves: the minimal use of machinery and a reliance on physical 
labour; the work is often carried out in relatively unregulated contexts 
characterized by hazardous conditions and a lack of safety measures and 
health and environmental protections; and artisanal mines often lack 
formal mining permits, titles or concessions. Many artisanal miners 
work seasonally and link income from mining with other livelihood 
activities, such as agriculture. And, it is very important to note, that in 
many communities – including those in the eastern DRC – artisanal 
mining makes important contributions to socio-economic development 
by providing employment and injecting money directly into the local 
economy. 
Artisanal mining is widely viewed as one of the most important 
forms of employment in the DRC. Drawing on available data, the 
World Bank has estimated the number of people in the DRC directly or 
indirectly dependent on artisanal mining for their livelihood at between 
8 and 10 million, or 14 to 16 percent of the total population (World 
Bank, 2010b). Available estimates for the number of artisanal miners in 
the Kivu provinces, taken from 2007 and 2010 respectively, put the 
figure between 200,000 and 350,000 (De Souza, 2007; Pact, 2010). 
Using the World Bank’s methodology of allowing five dependents per 
artisanal miner, we can project that approximately one to 1.75 million 
people are dependent on artisanal mining for their livelihood in the 
Kivu provinces, or nine to 17 percent of the total population. Factoring 
in secondary economies and supply chains, the number of people 
directly and indirectly dependent on artisanal mining is even greater, 
                                                          
6 2002 DRC Mining Code. WHAT ARTICLE? 
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making artisanal mining the most important livelihood strategy in the 
Kivu provinces. 
 
b) Mining and conflict 
 
There is no simple way to understand the waves of devastating 
conflict that have impacted the Congolese people and the DRC (and 
Zaire, as the country was known before 1997). Political violence in the 
DRC has led to the deaths of over 5.5 million people, making this the 
most deadly conflict since the Second World War.7 The vast majority of 
victims have been civilians who have suffered massacres, rape, torture 
and mass displacement on a scale that is difficult to comprehend.  
The conflict is often viewed as beginning with what is known as 
the First Congo War (1996-1997), which involved many factors that 
remain unresolved today and continue to contribute to violence and 
instability. There are two significant causal factors for the war: the 
collapse of the Congolese state after decades of brutal rule by President 
Mobutu Sese Seko and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 
The authoritarian rule of President Mobutu began in 1965, half a 
decade after Belgium ended its colonial rule over the territory and 
following a number of internal political struggles. He ruled the country 
for thirty years, instituting multiple policies that encouraged corruption, 
hindered economic development and defined the state as largely 
ineffectual in providing for the Congolese people. However, as a strong 
Cold War ally of the U.S. and other Western powers, President Mobuto 
received substantial international support and played a key role in many 
regional proxy wars. However, by the 1990s the Congolese state, 
including its army and multiple security forces, was oscillating between 
weakness, failure and collapse, and had nearly fully imploded.  
In 1994, the Rwandan genocide was committed. Over a period 
of one hundred days, a Hutu dominated government mobilized its 
supporters to kill over 800,000 people, the vast majority of whom were 
Tutsis. The killing was largely done with hand weapons and motivated 
no significant international response. The Hutu government was forced 
from power when a Tutsi insurgency, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RFP), defeated its forces. This led to a mass exodus from Rwanda 
largely across the border into Zaire (as the DRC was then known). 
Around 1.5 million Rwandans ended up settling in the eastern 
DRC (Reyntjens, 2009). These included Hutu genocidaires (those 
responsible for the genocide), Hutus fleeing feared retaliation and also 
some Tutsi swept up in the chaos and uncertainty of the moment. Hutu 
                                                          
7 It is important to note that nine out of ten of those who died in the 
conflict are believed to have perished from exposure, disease, 
malnutrition and other causes related to the combination of their 
poverty, displacement and profound vulnerability coupled with limited 
access to forms of medical aid and or other types of assistance.  
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militant elements who found themselves now based in the eastern DRC, 
including the extremist organization, the Interahamwe, were intent on 
launching a military offensive to return to power in Kigali, the capital 
city of Rwanda. When the Mobutu government began supporting and 
arming Hutu militias planning to pursue this, the newly established 
Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government, led by the former RFP 
guerrillas, responded with force.   
In 1996 the Rwandan government helped form a new 
Congolese rebel movement, known as the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL). With Rwandan, 
Angolan and Ugandan military and financial support (significantly, 
prominent members of the RPF had fought alongside President 
Museveni of Uganda in the Ugandan Bush War that had brought him to 
power), the AFDL marched all the way from the eastern DRC to 
Kinshasa, facing minimal resistance from what was left of Mobutu’s 
army. On 17 May 1997, AFDL’s leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, declared 
himself President and renamed the country from Zaire to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Little more than a year later, the Second Congo War (1998-
2003) began. It wasn’t until this period of violence that minerals and 
mining in the eastern DRC (and in North and South Kivu in particular) 
began to play a significant role in the DRC conflict.  
Deteriorating relations between the Rwandan government and 
the newly installed DRC government culminated in 1998 with Kabila 
ordering all Rwandan and Ugandan military forces to leave the DRC. In 
response, Rwanda and Uganda backed a new armed group, the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD), which launched a number of military 
offensives across the eastern DRC. What followed was more than four 
years of fighting that at its height involved nine African states (the 
DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, 
and Sudan) and around 20 armed groups. For this reason, this conflict is 
commonly referred to as the Great War of Africa.  
Finally, in December 2002, all warring factions signed the 
Global and All Inclusive Agreement that outlined plans for a 
transitional government that would lead the way to legislative and 
presidential elections. These elections were eventually held in 2006, 
leading to the election of Joseph Kabila (son of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s, 
who was assassinated by one of his bodyguards in 2001) as President in 
the first multiparty elections in the country in 41 years. 
Since this time, conflict in the eastern DRC has been 
characterized by relatively low-level skirmishes between FARDC and 
non-state armed groups, as well as between non-state armed groups 
themselves. Today, despite the recent surrender of the March 23 
Movement (M23), more than 50 armed groups remain active in the 
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eastern DRC, ranging from small vigilante groups to larger-scale, more 
sophisticated rebel militias.8 
Congo political analyst and former coordinator of the UN DRC 
Group of Experts, Jason Stearns, has compared the conflict in the DRC 
to a babushka doll, with conflicts sitting inside conflicts sitting inside 
conflicts.9 While the above timeline of key events gives a flavor of the 
national and regional levels to the conflict, it’s important to also 
recognize the myriad conflicts being played out at the local level. 
Indeed, it has been argued that it is by focusing on the national and 
regional elements of the conflict at the expense of the local, that 
international efforts to resolve the conflict continue to fall short. These 
lower-level conflicts are based around local issues, such as who controls 
land or which customary chief is in power. Crucially, these conflicts are 
often divided along ethnic lines, and it is these ethnic divides which 
national and regional actors leverage and play upon when trying to 
advance their own aims and ambitions. 
It was during the Second Congo War that forces from Rwanda 
and Uganda, along with numerous Congolese militia groups, established 
control of the production and trade in minerals throughout the Kivu 
provinces. Research in North Kivu and South Kivu has revealed how 
various rural militias replaced customary chiefs as references of 
authority during this period. This new dynamic took place in the 
context of state implosion, leading to a situation of mutual benefit 
between armed groups and local businessmen. While armed groups 
benefited from the presence of existing exploitation and trade routes to 
skim off profits, they also found themselves being deployed by local 
businessmen to protect their enterprises (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 
2005). There are many recorded instances, such as in one of the mining 
sites under study for this project, of armed groups being called into a 
mining area to provide protection to the mining community, in return 
for a share of the profits (interestingly, this goes against the common 
perception of armed groups as an unwanted presence in mining areas).  
This dynamic continues to this day, and while quantitative data 
is hard to come by, it is clear that state and non-state armed groups alike 
have benefited from the mineral trade in the eastern DRC since around 
the time of the global coltan boom in 2001 (Aloys et al., 2010). Perhaps 
the most well-known and oft-cited example of this phenomenon is the 
Bisie mine in North Kivu, which until recently was responsible for 
around 70% of cassiterite production in the province, and was heavily 
militarized and controlled by the Congolese army.   
The following quotation, taken from an IRC Advocacy Brief is 
representative of the style in which this trend has been reported by 
international NGOs and advocacy organizations: 
                                                          
8 See http://christophvogel.net/2013/12/10/the-landscape-of-armed-
groups-in-eastern-congo/ 
9 See http://www.obamaslaw.com/the-experts/jason-stearns/  
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Congo is one of the cruelest conflict zones for women 
and girls in recent history. Tens of thousands of women 
and girls have been raped, sexually assaulted, attached 
and abducted in North and South Kivu, targeted by all 
armed groups with unparalleled levels of brutality. (IRC 
2010: 1) 
 
In a rather simplistic reduction of events, the case was made that armed 
groups were raping women for access to mineral resources. While 
reductionist as an analytical lens, it proved a highly effective advocacy 
tool, and the relationship between armed groups’ control of mineral 
exploitation and the continuation of conflict achieved global attention, 
reaching as high as the United Nations Security Council (Marysse, 
2005). 
Around the same time, Paul Collier’s ‘greed and grievance’ thesis 
was emerging and establishing itself among international policymakers 
working on complex emergencies. Collier’s thesis was based on an 
analysis of seven quantitative indices (three to measure greed and four 
to measure grievance) and concluded that greed, and not grievance, was 
the overwhelming cause of modern conflict. This influential work, 
combined with the growing evidence documenting the exploitation of 
minerals by armed groups in the eastern DRC, led many to take the 
view that the conflict in the eastern DRC was nothing more than a 
bloody resource war, and should be treated as such. 
As a result, terms such as ‘blood mobiles’ and ‘conflict minerals’ 
have seeped into the Western collective consciousness. But what exactly 
is a conflict mineral? Global Witness defines conflict resources as:  
 
natural resources whose systematic exploitation and 
trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from 
or result in the commission of serious violations of 
human rights, violations of international humanitarian 
law or violations amounting to crimes under 
international law.10  
 
The more specific legal term ‘conflict mineral’ is defined in 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer and 
Protection Act – which exclusively targets the eastern DRC and 
neighboring countries - as:  
 
columbite-tantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore 
from which tantalum is extracted); cassiterite (the metal 
ore from which tin is extracted); gold; wolframite (the 
metal ore from which tungsten is extracted); or their 
                                                          
10 See http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict  
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derivatives; or any other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an 
adjoining country.11  
 
These four minerals are today commonly referred to as the 
Three T’s (tantalum, tin, and tungsten) and gold. Tantalum is used 
primarily in the production of capacitors, which are found in a wide 
range of electronics products, including laptops, smartphones, and 
cameras. Tin is used to produce tin cans and as solder on electronic 
circuit boards. Tungsten is an extremely dense metal used for products 
requiring this property, such as anchors and dart tips. Gold is most 
commonly used in jewelry and electronics.  
In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the above-
mentioned Dodd-Frank Act, and in March 2013, Canada followed suit 
with similar legislation also targeting the Three Ts and gold in the 
eastern DRC and neighboring countries. In June 2013, the European 
Commission held a public consultation on the issue, with a view to 
introducing similar legislation in 2014, albeit with an expected wider 
mandate moving beyond the geographic region of the African Great 
Lakes and the four minerals of the Three Ts and gold. 
Numerous critiques have been made of the assumed links 
between armed groups and mining, based on the fact that “it presumed 
a [...] very partial analysis of the causes and dynamics of conflict in the 
DRC: namely that because armed actors use money deriving from 
natural resources, they are fighting about natural resources” (Johnson, 
2010). In reality, the root causes of the conflict may be found in long-
standing grievances, political, economic and social marginalization and 
state failure, and only a small minority of Congolese conflicts are over 
natural resources12. Moreover, minerals are not the only source of 
financing for armed groups, but just “one dimension of a wide 
repertoire of military economic practices” (Verweijen, 2013). Armed 
groups also rely on taxation of citizens, revenues collected at roadblocks 
and trade in cigarettes and drugs, charcoal, timber and bananas (Laudati, 
2011). So cutting them off from this one source of revenue is unlikely 
to stop the violence.  
Ultimately, minerals are not what the conflict was about when it 
began in 1996, nor are they what the conflict is about today. Thus, a 
narrow focus on attempting to cut armed groups off from mineral 
revenue is likely to meet with, at best, limited success in resolving the 
conflict in the region. Most likely, in the context of a war economy and 
in the absence of efforts to re-establish a legitimate Congolese state, it 
                                                          
11 See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf  
12 Autesserre [17] notes that only 8 per cent of Congolese conflicts are 
estimated to be over natural resources. 
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will simply shift the violence and extortion into other economic sectors 
and onto other local, non-mining communities. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 
 
a) Artisanal mining, regulation and law 
 
There are multiple laws, rules and legal regimes that apply to the 
artisanal mines of the eastern DRC. These include: international human 
rights law; international humanitarian law; general domestic DRC law, 
including the country’s constitution and labor laws; and specific DRC 
laws dealing with mining. In addition, there are a variety of regulatory 
schemes and programs designed to address the trade in conflict 
minerals. Some of these are legally binding and others are not. And, 
some expressly involve the DRC government and others are external to 
the country’s legal and governance systems. This complex, multi-layered 
set of laws, rules, guidelines and legal obligations provide a significant 
framework for understanding the human suffering associated with the 
artisanal mining industry as legal violations.   
The most severely harmful acts linked to the industry, such as 
torture, rape and forced labor are widely prohibited by multiple 
international and domestic laws. The same is true of child labor, illegal 
detentions, denial of due process and other aspects of the lived 
experience of artisanal mining in the DRC that directly harm miners and 
others. In fact, these actions are so consistently and generally prohibited 
by international and domestic law that the question of their illegality is 
not an issue.  
In addition, there are a number of domestic DRC laws that 
focus on mining including many provisions that focus specifically on 
artisanal mining. These rules outline a number of practices, often with 
great specificity such as limiting artisanal mining only to formally 
registered sites, allowing only miners with official identification cards to 
work in the industry and detailing multiple safety standards. 
The point here is that there exist substantial, multiple 
overlapping laws and regulations that cover many, if not most, of the 
substantive harms experienced by miners and others in the artisanal 
mining industry. The issue, then, is not so much the need for more law, 
but rather the creation and management of protective systems that build 
on a foundation of fundamental rights to significantly improve the 
conditions in the industry.  
The application of laws and regulations to the artisanal mining 
industry in the DRC suffers from at least two primary challenges. First, 
the fact that many widely practiced actions are illegal (as defined by 
multiple laws and legal regimes) does not, in itself, enable the use of 
these laws to address systematic violations. The system of artisanal 
mining is defined by widespread violations of the law at multiple levels 
and by multiple actors within the industry. In fact, violations of law are 
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the norm and not the exception throughout the region. Respect for 
technically applicable and potentially helpful rules and regulations is so 
widely and consistently violated as to question the efficacy and value of 
these laws. 
Second, many of those responsible for harmful acts and 
violations are non-state actors such as armed groups, mine bosses, crew 
bosses, and traditional authorities. This means that the significance of 
legal prohibitions is complex in terms of how the law can be applied. 
And virtually all discussions of law, whether international or domestic, 
require an engagement with the capacity, solidity, reach and 
functionality of the DRC government. Given that one of the defining 
features of the eastern DRC is the inability of the state to effectively 
project its authority throughout the region, the significance and 
meaning of laws and regulations itself is a core question in the area.  
Overall, it is clear that the current conditions within the artisanal 
mines of the eastern DRC present multiple, systematic violations of law 
and fundamental rights. The review which follows provides an overview 
of some of the core laws, regulations and legal regimes relevant to a 
discussion of these violations. The primary purpose of this review is to 
provide a foundation for discussing the documentation of the lived 
experience of legal violations and harms outlined by the project 
research, analysis, and recommendations. Rather than presenting a 
comprehensive review of the defining law in this area, this section 
highlights the rather substantial set of legal obligations relevant to this 
industry. The section reviews general laws, both international and 
domestic as well as specific DRC laws on artisanal mining, as well as an 
overview of conflict mineral policies and programs. 
 
b) General laws dealing with human rights and labor 
 
International human rights and labor law – The DRC is bound by 
multiple elements of international law of relevance to the artisanal 
mining industry. These include core components of international 
human rights law and the related field of international labor law and, as 
regards the nation’s ongoing armed conflict, international humanitarian 
law (also known as the laws of war).13  
                                                          
13 One of the oldest forms of international law are the laws of war, also 
known as international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. 
In general, this body of law is defined by international customary law – 
that is, legal principles established over time by consistent state practice 
– and treaty law, most significantly defined by the Geneva Conventions 
and their optional protocols. International humanitarian law seeks to 
regulate warfare, the most destructive and harmful of activities and 
provides broad protections to civilians and others. As a rule, 
international humanitarian law limits actions not related to clear military 
objectives and, as such, provides guidance on the abuses committed by 
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The DRC has accepted the legal obligations of the two 
foundational human rights treaties (also known as “conventions” and 
“human rights instruments”) that define the international human rights 
system. These are the International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant for Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These treaties are sometimes linked with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and termed “the 
international bill of human rights”. While the UDHR is not a binding 
treaty, it outlines core defining human rights principles issued by the 
United Nations in 1948 and provides a foundational understanding of 
these principles.  The ICCPR and the ICESCR, on the other hand, are 
treaties that outline binding legal obligations for those nations, known 
as “states parties”, that have voluntarily accepted the treaties. The DRC 
is a state party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR and, therefore, is 
legally obligated to abide by the provisions outlined in the two 
covenants. 
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted by United Nations 
General Assembly in 1966 and “entered into force”, that is became 
legally binding on state parties, in 1976. It took nearly three decades for 
the international community to move from a commitment to creating a 
binding international human rights treaty to the point where the two 
principal treaties became a core part of international law. This history is 
very significant for understanding international human rights because it 
demonstrates both the necessary historical evolution of the field as well 
as a general sense of the growing legitimacy and coverage of human 
rights around the world. Currently, the ICCPR has 167 state parties and 
the ICESCR has 161 states parties.  
Since the ICCPR and ICESCR entered into force, there has 
been a steady increase in the number of international human rights 
treaties as well as a general expansion in their scope, coverage and 
legitimacy. The DRC is also a state party to other key international 
human rights treaties of relevance to the artisanal mining industry and 
related abuses including: the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the 
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention of the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). 
                                                                                                                                       
armed groups against civilians within the artisanal mining industry.  
While technically the legal obligations within international humanitarian 
law are clearest as regards the behavior of states and official armies, 
many actions by non-state parties, which represent the vast majority of 
armed groups in the DRC, are also covered. These include prohibitions 
on torture, rape and sexual violence, forced labor and the intimidation 
and harming of civilians. While this study does not overtly engage this 
body of law in reference to the conditions in the artisanal mining 
industry, there are situations where its application is relevant. 
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Alongside these general human rights treaties, there are a 
number of international treaties that focus specifically on working 
conditions created by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The 
ILO, founded in 1919, is one of the oldest institutions within the 
modern human rights system. It was later incorporated into the UN and 
remains a core international institution for defining basic labor rights 
and working to promote social justice and improve worker protections 
around the world. The ILO focuses on the core role of work and labor 
rights in creating and enabling a more humane world.  
While the ILO develops multiple standards and 
recommendations, it has a history of developing a series of core 
conventions. The DRC has signed on to all of these, including: the 
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 
98); the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29); the Abolition of 
Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105); the Equal Remuneration 
Convention (No. 100): the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); the Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (138); and the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, 1999 (No 182). These international labor rights treaties 
cover many key aspects of worker protections including prohibitions on 
forced labor, child labor, discrimination in the workforce as well as 
support for workers’ rights to organize, be paid fairly, labor in safe 
conditions and otherwise be treated with respect. 
In addition, the DRC participates in two regional African 
organizations of relevance to artisanal mining and other key human 
rights and labor protections. These are the African Union (AU) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
The AU is the regional body of African states and includes 
almost all African countries. Its fundamental structure and principles are 
defined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which 
includes multiple basic labor and human rights protections including 
rights of association and assembly and rights to fair wages and safe 
working conditions, although these are not as detailed or 
comprehensive as in other international documents. AU states are also 
bound by the African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare of the 
Child which defines key labor rights for children and obligates member 
states to take action to prevent child labor. 
The DRC is also a member of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) which is an inter-governmental 
organization whose mission is to improve social, economic, political, 
and security cooperation among 15 southern African states. The SADC 
outlines core rights issues in the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. 
Some of the articles of the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
of relevance to artisanal mining include: Article 5, which references 
Conventions of the International Labor Organization; Article 6 - Equal 
Treatment for Men and Women; Article 7 - Protection of Children and 
Young People; Article 11 - Improvement of Living and Working 
16 
 
Conditions; Article 12 - Protection of Health, Safety, and Environment; 
and Article 14 - Employment and Remuneration. Other SADC 
documents of relevance include the Protocol on Health and the 
Protocol on Mining. 
Below is an overview of some select rights and state obligations 
relevant to the artisanal mining industry referenced in fundamental 
international human rights treaties and declarations. This illustrates the 
multiple, overlapping prohibitions outlined in different international 
legal instruments, highlighting the consistent and reinforcing nature of 
international law as regards these issues. 
 
o Protections from slavery and forced labor  
o UDHR, Article 4; Article 23(1) 
o ICCPR, Article 8 
o ICESCR, Article 6 
o Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No, 29)  
o Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 
105) 
 
o Protections from discrimination based on gender, race, 
nationality, political opinion, social origin or religion 
o UDHR, Article 7, Article 23(2) 
o ICCPR, Article 2, Article 26 
o ICESCR, Article 2 
o CEDAW 
 
o Protections for free association, collective bargaining and 
the creation of labor unions 
o UDHR, Article 20; Article 23(4) 
o ICCPR, Article 22(1) 
o ICESCR, Article 8 
o ILO Convention 87, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7 
o ILO Convention 98, Articles 1, 2 and 3 
o The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98): 
o The Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention, 1949 (No. 87) 
 
o Protections for fair wages and decent labor conditions, 
including a safe workplace 
o UDHR, Article 23; Article 24 
o ICESCR, Article 6, Article 7, Article 11 
o The Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100): 
o Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111) 
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o Protections against the use of child labor 
o ICCPR, check 
o ICESCR, Article 10 
o Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (138) 
o Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No 
182) 
o African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare of the 
Child: Article 15 -Child Labor 
 
General DRC domestic law – The DRC’s constitution and key 
elements of national legislation provide multiple human rights and labor 
rights protections. The nation’s constitution outlines many key core 
human rights principles including basic due process rights and other 
core civil and political rights, the right to be free from discrimination 
and key foundational aspects of an orderly rights-based system of 
governance. In terms of specific rights widely violated in the artisanal 
mining industry, the DRC constitution bans slavery and forced labor. In 
addition, the constitution enshrines a number of core labor rights.14  
The DRC also has substantive domestic laws on labor issues of 
relevance to the artisanal mining industry. Two laws of special relevance 
are the Labor Code15 and the National Law on Child Protection.16 
The Labor Code provides for a series of regulations that 
structure the relationship between employers and workers in all fields. 
The law covers wage issues, including a minimum wage regulated by the 
Ministry of Labor. The law commonly references minimal conditions 
for labor contracts which, as key employment rights, should apply to 
employment relations that exist outside of formal arrangements, as is 
the norm in the artisanal mining industry.  The law regulates what can 
be withheld from wages (a significant issue in the mines), legal working 
hours, required rest periods, holidays and other related issues. The law 
also regulates health and safety conditions and requires a set of minimal 
conditions to minimize accidents and protect worker safety.  
In a related issue, the Child Protection Act restricts child labor. 
It states that no one younger than 16 can be formally employed and that 
children younger than the age of 15 may not work as apprentices. It also 
stipulates that children between the ages of 16 and 18 may not be 
employed in heavy labor and that those younger than 18 may not be 
employed for more than four hours a day.   
                                                          
14 “No one may be held in slavery or in a similar condition. No one may 
be subject to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment…No one may be 
submitted to forced or compulsory labour.” DRC Constitution, Article 
16. 
15  DRC Act 015/2002. 
16 DRC Act 09/2001. 
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These laws also specify the ways in which they will be enforced 
by state agents. And, they outline substantial penalties, including fines 
and prison sentences, for employers that violate the law.  
 
c) Specific DRC laws and regulations on artisanal mining 
 
 The DRC has two specific domestic laws and related regulations 
dealing with mining in general, the 2002 Mining Code, and with the 
artisanal mining industry, the 2003 Mining Regulations. Both of these 
laws specifically address different elements of the artisanal mining 
industry and define a set of responsibilities and obligations for various 
state agents as well as for private individuals involved in operating 
artisanal mines and working within them. In addition, the specific 
elements of the Mining Code are clarified in the Artisanal Miners Code 
of Conduct. 
 
 2002 Mining Code – The Mining Code provides a number of 
specific provisions designed to introduce order and multiple forms of 
protection and supervision into the artisanal mining industry. These 
include many requirements about who can work as an artisanal miner 
including that artisanal miners must be Congolese adults17 and must 
hold an artisanal miner’s card issued by the government.18  It also 
outlines multiple specific requirements for identifying and approving 
sites for legal artisanal mining including that artisanal mining can only 
take place in authorized locations that are approved by the Ministry of 
Mines19 and that these sites will be approved only if studies show that 
commercial exploitation is not viable.20  
The law also envisions a series of reviews of the impact of 
artisanal mining prior to approval including consultations with local 
authorities regarding plans for local community development21 and 
other similar processes that suggest that a legal artisanal mine can only 
be opened with significant substantive review of its impact.  In addition, 
the Mining Code includes multiple provisions regarding safety, 
appropriate water use and environmental impact.22 
It is important to note that the many specific aspects of legal 
artisanal mining outlined in the 2002 Mining Code are at times in 
conflict with local rules and the various and competing supervisory 
authorities of different state and non-state bodies. If these laws were 
seriously and comprehensively applied, this could produce multiple 
problems in regulating the industry, but since the laws are largely not 
                                                          
17 Article 26, 2002 Mining Code. 
18 Article 5, 2002 Mining Code. 
19 Article 10, 2002 Mining Code. 
20 Article 104 and Article 109, 2002 Mining Code. 
21 Article 69, 2002 Mining Code. 
22 Article 112 and other provisions, 2002 Mining Code. 
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used, they become a complex and uncertain reference point for making 
sense of the actual rights of miners and others and the meaningful 
limitations on the industry.  For example, state mining agents might 
claim the right do to one thing as enshrined in the Mining Code, while 
other state authorities might claim a different regulatory power while 
local traditional chiefs might claim other competing rights. What could 
result is a set of conflicting claims as our study found in Lemera (for 
example, to visit the mine site one must seek permission from state 
agents and representatives of traditional authorities). 
 
2003 Mining Regulations – The 2003 Mining Regulations 
provide a number of specific rules that define proper legal management 
of mines and mining activities within the DRC. These regulations 
outline an additional set of rules that are supposed to build on the 2002 
Mining Code and clarify the protections and rights of miners as well as 
the ways in which the state is responsible for ensuring regularity and 
order within the industry. These regulations include a set of legal 
limitations on the actions of miners including paperwork requirements 
such as signing an artisanal mining declaration, respecting customary 
rules and minimizing the environmental impact of mining.23  The rules 
also: ban the use of explosives and mercury (which is widely employed 
to extract gold)24; make it illegal to clear land with controlled burning 
and require miners to rehabilitate areas where mining is practiced25; 
carefully dispose of garbage and human waste26; suspend mining if 
prehistoric or historic remains are discovered27; ensure that mining is 
not too noisy and occurs only during daylight hours to avoid disturbing 
residents28; and avoid washing minerals within 20 meters of a water 
source to avoid contamination.29   
The Mining Regulations also include multiple provisions 
designed to protect the health and safety of miners including: banning 
tunnels that are deeper than 30 meters30 and participation in training 
courses offered by the Ministry of Mines.31    
These rules may appear highly reasonable and present a vision of 
artisanal mining that is carefully controlled and held to high standards of 
concern for the local community, the environment and the potential 
negative impact of the industry. The language of the rules suggests a 
strong, centralized state with multiple representatives that are 
                                                          
23 Article 1, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
24 Article 2, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
25 Article 3, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
26 Article 4, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
27 Article 5, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
28 Article 8, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
29 Article 10, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
30 Article 9, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
31 Article 12, 2003 Mining Regulations. 
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empowered to ensure that decent protective standards are the norm, 
which is not the case of governance in the DRC. Yet, this vision of 
regulation, which is partially implemented, is ill-suited to a country as 
vast and locally varied as the DRC. Our research revealed constant 
complaints on the part of local authorities that actions of various kinds 
could only be undertaken with permission from local centers of power 
such as Bukavu and Goma as well as reference to approvals, review and 
communication from the officials in Kinshasa, the capital. Even local 
mining cooperatives (now mandatory) must have their paperwork 
officially recognized and approved in Kinshasa, creating multiple 
problems and inefficiencies.  
 
d) DRC Mining institutions and mining governance 
 
The Congolese Ministry of Mines is responsible for ensuring 
overall management of the artisanal mining sector, and contains a 
number of agencies and technical services charged with specific 
objectives and responsibilities within this general remit, as defined by 
the country’s 2002 Mining Code (referenced above). These include:  
 The National Minister of Mines; 
 The Provincial Authority of Mines; 
 The Mining Registry (CAMI); 
 The Geology Directorate; 
 The Directorate of Mines; 
 The Department in Charge of the Protection of the 
Mining Environment; 
 The Technical Unit for Coordination and Planning of 
Mining (CTCPM); 
 The Service for Assistance and Organization of Artisanal 
and Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) and; 
 The Centre for Evaluation, Expertise, and Certification 
(CEEC). 
 
Often, there is unnecessary duplication and overlapping of roles 
between these distinct agencies. For example, three separate agencies 
are required for an Artisanal Exploitation Zone (AEZ) to be opened: 
the National Minister of Mines to create the AEZ, the Mining Registry 
to register the AEZ in the national database, and finally the Geology 
Directorate to officially open the AEZ. The inability of these three 
agencies to coordinate and open officially recognized AEZ’s in North 
Kivu and South Kivu has been cited by Congolese researchers working 
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on ASM in the eastern DRC as a major obstacle to improving working 
security of miners in the region.32 
Of these agencies, SAESSCAM is perhaps the most important 
in terms of its on-the-ground role, as the government authority vested 
with the responsibility for organizing and supervising the artisanal 
mining sector. It has risen to prominence in recent years as a result of 
the numerous recent initiatives to regulate and formalize the mining 
sector described in section 1.b) above,. Its key objectives include: 
providing training and technical assistance to improve the capacity of 
those working in ASM; monitoring the flow of materials produced by 
ASM from the mine to the point of sale and; ensuring that the correct 
taxes from ASM are collected for the state (Pact, 2010).  
However, SAESSCAM has been the focus of much criticism 
due to its lack of financial, logistical, or technical capacity to fulfil its 
mandate and – of even greater cause for concern - its direct implication 
in violating the rights of artisanal miners, evidence corroborated by the 
research findings of this report (discussed in further detail in section 4. 
below). While these criticisms have in the past led to recommendations 
for reform of SAESSCAM, its role as another level of extortion and 
harassment over miners has become so embedded that a recent report 
by Southern Africa Resource Watch (2012) called for SAESSCAM to be 
totally restructured or closed down.  
The example of SAESSCAM is reflective of a broader structural 
challenge experienced by all the agencies and technical services 
operating within the Ministry of Mines (and the Congolese government 
in the eastern DRC at large). Under-resourced, they find themselves 
unable to effectively fulfil their mandates, which require significant 
logistical capacity to traverse the vast distances between and to mine 
sites and significant technical capacity to effectively carry out their work 
once there. Underpaid or unpaid, the agents who are in the field find 
themselves needing to resort to alternative strategies to survive, often 
including extortion or theft from the very miners they are there to 
support and work with.  
These are not the only problems that workers at the bottom of 
the ASM supply chain have to contend with. While ASM is legalized 
and therefore to a certain extent protected by the Congolese Mining 
Code (2002), Mining Regulations (2003) and Investment Code (2002), 
the lack of officially recognized Artisanal Exploitation Zones (AEZs) 
leaves miners and other workers vulnerable to extortion and harassment 
from authorities, as under state law working outside of an AEZ is 
illegal. Of the few AEZs that do exist, information on the ground 
regarding their existence is scarce. Furthermore, within these zones, 
artisanal miners must apply for a ‘carte d’exploitant artisanal’, an official 
                                                          
32 See http://kivumining.org/2012/06/19/what-needs-to-be-done-to-
improve-the-working-conditions-and-quality-of-life-for-those-working-
at-or-near-the-bottom-of-the-mineral-supply-chain-in-the-kivus/ 
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authorization card to mine, which must be renewed each year. 
However, the process for obtaining this card is centralized and 
bureaucratic, needing to be signed off at the level of the Provincial 
Governor. This poses serious problems for many miners, adding to 
their vulnerability, as they are often illiterate and many days travel from 
the provincial capital (and, even were they able to travel to the 
provincial capital, there is no guarantee of being able to obtain the 
required authorization card within a realistic timeframe). 
One area which held initial promise for improving the 
organization of miners and governance of the ASM sector was the 
formation of mining cooperatives. Under the Mining Regulations, all 
artisanal miners wanting to operate in an AEZ must form under a 
mining cooperative. However, on the ground these cooperatives rarely 
seem to function in the common understanding of the word, that is, as 
an organization owned and run jointly by its members for an equitable 
distribution of any profits or benefits. Instead, they are often established 
and run by powerful families or business networks, offering no real 
benefits to its members. Board members are unelected and 
unaccountable, and there is little semblance of democratic functioning 
or impression that the organization speaks for and serves the interest of 
its members. The fact that the cooperatives must be officially registered 
and recognized by authorities in Kinshasa is likely a contributing factor 
here, as local miners rarely have the required means to avoid the cost of 
this long journey, placing it beyond their reach, and making them 
dependent upon those with the money to finance such a trip. 
So while in law, the idea of forming mining cooperatives to 
support and protect miners seemed to hold potential for positive 
change, the top-down measure appears in many cases to have had the 
reverse effect, creating another layer of harassment, extortion, and 
control of workers. This is symptomatic of a wider problem with efforts 
to regulate and formalize ASM in the context of a failed state; until 
government agencies and services are adequately paid and resourced to 
do their work and there is functioning rule of law, any efforts on paper 
to regulate or formalize the sector or improve the lot of workers are 
likely, at best, to fall short, and at worst, to impact negatively on the 
lived experiences of miners and others working at the bottom of the 
mineral supply chain. 
According to DRC law, there are multiple state agencies that are 
responsible for ensuring that the 2002 Mining Code, the 2003 Mining 
Regulations, and the multiple other domestic laws and rules are 
effectively enforced. These institutions include: the national office of 
the Ministry of Mines which is responsible for approving legal artisanal 
mining zones and issuing authorization for processing minerals 
extracted from these mines; the Provincial Mining Authority that issues 
miner’s cards; the Mining Registry that is responsible for creating a 
national database of legal artisanal areas which cannot conflict with 
industrial mining operations; the Geology Directorate that provides 
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technical advice used to open and close legal artisanal mining 
operations; the Mining Directorate that is responsible for gathering data 
in artisanal and other mining and controls and inspects artisanal mines 
among other responsibilities; and the Provincial Governor whose office 
is responsible for managing the system of formal cards that allow 
individual traders to work in the artisanal mining industry, buying and 
selling minerals.  
In addition, the 2002 Mining Code outlines a number of other 
state agencies with various responsibilities. These include: the Cellule 
Technique de Coordination et de Planification Miniere (CTCPM) which collects 
statistics on artisanal mining and publishes material on the industry and 
also develops improved technical approaches to artisanal extraction; and 
the Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification (CEEC) which certifies 
and evaluates minerals and precious stones, provides technical support 
to traders and processors and certifies export taxes.  And, the law 
creates the previously mentioned SAEESCAM. 
 
e) Efforts to regulate conflict minerals 
 
Over the past several years, multiple actors within the DRC and 
the international community have created a series of different systems 
and initiatives to address the issue of conflict minerals in the country. 
These mechanisms vary in terms of their legal status and regulatory 
demands. They are not necessarily integrated and many are too new to 
be effectively assessed in terms of whether or not they will have a 
positive long-term impact. Most of these initiatives are based on the 
concepts of due diligence, certification, and traceability (Verbruggen, 
Francq, & Cuvelier, 2011)33.    
Due diligence requires companies to develop and implement 
internal systems and procedures to determine the precise origin of 
minerals being purchased from known conflict areas. The initiative has 
gained momentum over recent years, most significantly from section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. legislation passed in July 2010 
demanding due diligence from American companies sourcing minerals 
from the DRC (discussed in further detail below). Certification and 
traceability respond to the demands of due diligence by making it 
possible for final buyers on the international market to determine 
whether minerals have been sourced from conflict or non-conflict areas. 
Certification traces the supply-chain while encompassing a 
consideration of safety, health and environmental factors, and 
traceability ‘bags and tags’ minerals sourced from approved ‘non-
conflict’ mining areas on site before transporting them to the trade 
counters of Bukavu and Goma.  
                                                          
33 The referenced report provides a good, critical overview of national 
and international conflict mineral initiatives in the DRC.  
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Such traceability and certification systems have been proposed 
and piloted by the industry itself. Tin smelters represented by the 
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) have proposed a supply 
chain initiative called iTSCi or ITRI Tin Supply Chain initiative. The 
German government supported an initiative through the Federal Bureau 
of Geo-Sciences and Natural Resources (BGR) (Naeher, 2010). Other 
projects were launched by a private company Met Trak (CENADEP, 
2012) and by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) (Blore & Smillie, 2010). 
In 2009 the Congolese government published a ‘handbook for 
traceability’, detailing all the steps to be taken, all actors and services 
involved in tracing the origins of minerals, certifying and taxing them, 
and even the fixed ‘routes’ minerals should take from the mine to the 
export office, passing through ‘centres de négoce’ or centralized trading 
points34. In accordance with the handbook, a number of mining sites 
have been assessed as being ‘green’, ‘yellow’ or ‘red’, depending on the 
level of conflict and the presence of practices like child labour or human 
rights abuses.  
But apart from a few small steps that have been taken, most 
procedures foreseen in the handbook or in the Mining Code are not yet 
operational. The impact of the technical certification and traceability 
initiatives is also very limited. Early evidence shows that they have failed 
to make significant progress in achieving their goals and have even 
negatively impacted ASM and the wider economy, as they have 
provoked a de facto ban on minerals from the Kivu provinces (Carisch 
2012; Geenen & Radley 2013; Johnson 2013; Triest 2012). 
What follows is a brief overview of the most significant national, 
regional and international responses to the issue of conflict minerals, 
which are useful to consider alongside the international and domestic 
laws discussed above: 
 
DRC Government – Possibly the most significant effort by the 
DRC government to regulate conflict minerals, in terms of its impact, 
was the mining ban announced by the Congolese Ministry of Mines on 
September 11, 2010. From then until March 10, 2011 all mining 
activities in North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema provinces were 
suspended.  
The decree specifically stated that it was intended to address 
“the link between the illegal exploitation and the illicit trade of mineral 
resources, the proliferation and tracking of arms by mafia and armed 
groups, and the recurrent insecurity” in these regions. 
Many voiced concerns about feasibility issues given the capacity 
level and low inclination of Congolese state institutions to effectively 
                                                          
34 Ministère des Mines, Ministère des Finances (2009) Manuel des 
procédures de traçabilité des produits miniers, de l’extraction à 
l’exportation.  
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implement the ban. Furthermore, from early on, there were reports of 
the involvement of the Congolese military in illegal mining activities, 
such as taking control of mining operations, forced labor and acting as 
paid security for artisanal miners who continued to work despite the 
ban. The Enough Project (2011) stated that “mining has not stopped 
and the ban has resulted in a windfall for the commanders of armed 
groups, mainly Congolese army officers, some of whom have hijacked 
trucks full of minerals”. 
The UN Group of Experts (UNGoE) reported that this had 
severe affects leading to the collapse of many artisanal mining and 
mineral trade structures and nearly halting registered exports of tin, 
tantalum and tungsten in the region. Smuggling in the Kivus, which had 
previously been declining, increased significantly as evidenced by sharp 
increases in export figures from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. 
Exceptionally high world market prices during this period mitigated the 
impact but simultaneously had a negative effect on transparency, 
regulatory and rights protection initiatives.   
Another initiative launched by the Congolese government 
known as STAREC (Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction 
des Zones sortant des conflits armés) aims to increase state authority 
over the sector and supervision of humanitarian and socio-economic 
components and prevent the involvement of armed groups in the trade.  
Part of the plan, launched in late 2009, was to set up five 
“Centres de négoce”, or mineral trading centers, in the eastern DRC. In 
collaboration with the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) the 
purpose of these centers was to create spaces where those working in 
the mining sector could do business safely and under the authority of 
state agents to create a stronger, more profitable, market environment 
with respected and regulated legal mechanisms. MONUSCO’s role in 
this endeavor was to help with the training of Congolese authorities and 
rehabilitation of key infrastructure components such as roads and 
centers. 
However, implementation has been slow. Four trading centers 
have been built but none are operational and the evaluation and 
certification of surrounding mining sites has not yet been completed. 
There are also ongoing legal issues surrounding privately owned mining 
concessions and difficulty regulating the legality and permitting of 
artisanal mining. 
 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – 
Established in 2004, ICGLR includes eleven governments (Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Zambia) and is the highest level regional organization addressing 
conflict minerals and security issues in eastern DRC.  
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The Regional Initiative on Natural Resources (RINR), also 
known as the Lusaka Declaration, was signed by the heads of all 
member states in December 2010. The RINR sets out a legal 
certification mechanism for natural resources in the Great Lakes 
Region. It enumerates six tools intended to address major resource 
related issues: 
 
1. Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for cassiterite, 
wolframite, coltan and gold; 
2. Harmonization of national legislation; 
3. Formalization of the artisanal mining sector; 
4. A regional database on mineral flows; 
5. Promotion of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) and; 
6. A whistle-blowing mechanism. 
 
The main component of the RINR is the RCM, which certifies 
the conduct of due diligence procedures throughout the supply chain 
and appropriate management of conflict risks. Implemented by 
individual ICGLR member states, the RCM has been praised for its 
regional buy-in (particularly important given the role of Rwanda and 
Uganda in activities in eastern DRC) and compatibility with other 
mechanisms such as the ITRI/iTSCI, BGR/CTC and OECD 
guidelines.  
However, there have been challenges with implementation such 
as gathering reliable statistics and lack of progress in areas such as 
harmonization of legislation and formalization of mining. Furthermore, 
the ICGLR has largely failed to address the complexities and lack of 
control over trade in gold from eastern DRC. 
 
OECD Guidelines – In 2011, the OECD published the Due 
Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas in an effort to formalize and promote a 
process for States and other actors involved in activities relating to 
conflict minerals in the interest of greater respect for human rights and 
breaking the link between mining and conflict. Heavily influenced by 
the recommendations of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (UNGoE), this publication offered a framework 
for companies that supply or use tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold (3TG) 
sourced from conflict-affected or high-risk areas. The Guidance follows 
a five-step approach: 
 
1. Establish strong company management systems; 
2. Identify and assess risks in the supply chain; 
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified 
risks; 
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4. Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due 
diligence at identified points of the supply chain; 
5. Report on supply chain due diligence. 
 
The OECD guidelines have several strengths. The process by 
which they were conceived has been praised for its inclusivity and has 
gained support from key stakeholders. Notably, these stakeholders 
include both significant governmental actors (such as the International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region) and significant industry 
organizations (such as the International Tin Research Institute and 
Global E-Sustainability Initiative), as well as international political 
bodies. 
Furthermore, the OECD guidelines have succeeded in creating 
a respected basis for due diligence of the supply chain of minerals from 
eastern DRC that targets risks related to conflict financing, forced and 
compulsory labor, the worst forms of child labor and other gross 
human rights violations. It provides actors in the supply-chain with a 
detailed and well-defined set of guidelines. The guidelines provide 
specifics on issues such as risk mitigation in the supply-chain of tin, 
tantalum and tungsten (3Ts) and due diligence measures by actors 
throughout the supply chain. For example, local mineral exporters are 
required to gather and disclose information on all payments of any kind 
made along the supply-chain; on the mine of mineral origin; on the 
identity of all intermediaries; on the locations where minerals are traded 
and processed; and on transportation routes. It is also recommended 
that this information is regularly checked by a team on the ground. 
However, there are areas of weakness in the guidelines. First and 
foremost, they are voluntary and entail no legal obligations for actors in 
the supply-chain. Companies that commit violations can be brought 
before the OECD National Contact Points (NCPs) in their home 
countries but the procedure results only in a statement, which is not 
legally binding and results in no punitive measures. Another issue is that 
the guidelines pose compliance challenges to actors in the upstream 
(mines to smelters/refiners) supply-chain. To address this, the OECD 
calls upon donors to support supply-chain monitoring capacity and 
improve governance systems more broadly. Overcoming the first 
weakness, in February 2012 the Congolese government adopted OECD 
due diligence guidelines into national law. In May 2012, the government 
drew on this new law to suspend the work of two trading houses (or 
comptoirs) in North Kivu due to their exportation of conflict minerals 
(although other, more opportunistic factors may have been at play). 
To evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of the 
guidelines, the OECD Secretariat conducted a pilot project between 
2011 and 2013. The subsequent reports published in 2013 concluded 
that “both, upstream and downstream companies have made significant 
improvements in their understanding of the conflict mineral issue as 
well as in the implementation of the first steps of the OECD 
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Guidance.” However, it noted that these companies’ activities were also 
influenced by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC’s 
adoption of rules on conflict minerals in August 2012. And, 
significantly, that a common response to anti-conflict mineral efforts is 
to avoid sourcing minerals from the region.  
 
Dodd-Frank35 – Passed in July 2010 and primarily concerning 
financial reform in the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act also contained three provisions, and one in 
particular, pertaining to mining in the DRC. Section 1502 of the Act 
specifically addresses mining activities in the DRC “helping to finance 
conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence … particularly 
sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency 
humanitarian situation therein.” This provision requires all companies 
traded and listed on the US stock exchange whose products contain 
“conflicts minerals” (defined as: coltan (columbite-tantalite), cassiterite, 
gold or wolframite) to publicly disclose whether these minerals originate 
from the DRC or an adjoining country.  
Companies must substantiate claims that conflict minerals do 
not originate from this region or, in the event that they do, must include 
a “Conflict Minerals Report” (CMR) in their annual SEC report. Often 
called a “name and shame” bill these reports must also be made public 
on companies’ websites.  
The CMR must contain an extensive report on due diligence 
measures taken “on the source and chain of custody of such minerals 
… and a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be 
manufactured that are not DRC conflict free … [and] the facilities used 
to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin of the conflict 
minerals, and the efforts to determine the minor location of origin with 
the greatest possible specificity.” Furthermore, these due diligence 
efforts are subjected to a private sector audit.  
One criticism of Section 1502 is that it lacks specificity in key 
areas. For example, the SEC was tasked with addressing this but due to 
the complexity and the multitude of actors the law concerns (in addition 
to the entire supply-chain it also effects manufactures from numerous 
industries such as the medical, automotive and jewelry industries, 
amongst others) clarification was delayed until after the law went into 
effect. 
Other concerns were voiced by numerous different actors 
involved. Companies expressed concerns about compliance costs and 
competitive disadvantages in the international market. European 
corporate representatives have also been impacted by a new wave of 
                                                          
35 For a full and recent evaluation of the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
see Manhart & Schleicher (2013) ‘Conflict minerals: An evaluation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and other resource-related measures’, Oko-Institut e. V., 
Freiburg. 
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requests relating to conflict minerals and their origin due to the SEC 
reporting requirements. Stakeholders from the eastern DRC complained 
that they were not adequately consulted and that they were already 
putting in place a traceability mechanism. The ICGLR, for example, 
argued that its tracking system reaches the points of export in DRC and 
is planned to be extended in the future.  
One of the most significant issues with the implications of the 
Dodd-Frank Act concerns its impact on the economy in eastern DRC. 
Some argue that the public disclosure requirement of the Act, which 
allows products containing no conflict minerals to be labeled “DRC 
conflict free” gives companies using any type of mineral from the 
region a negative public image and thereby discourages the use of 
materials from the Great Lakes Region.  
For example, in March 2011 the Malaysia Smelting Cooperation 
made the decision to stop purchasing minerals from the eastern DRC 
following the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act, prolonging the negative 
socio-economic impact of the presidential suspension and 
demonstrating the challenge posed by legislation requiring supply chain 
systems that were not yet in place. As one report stated:  
 
While the general goal of reducing the options and 
pathways of conflict financing is widely supported, it is 
often difficult for companies to distinguish between 
those sources linked to conflict and those from 
legitimate mining. To be on the safe side, it is much 
easier for many companies to follow a strategy of 
avoiding all materials that are somehow mined and 
traded under unclear conditions. (Manhart and 
Schleicher 2013: 33) 
 
Assessments of the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on security 
issues is debated. While the UNGoE points to positive results in 
improving security, particularly in remote mining areas, others note 
negative socio-economic consequences as well as an increase in 
smuggling. Another significant argument is that the resulting decrease in 
economic opportunities actually fuelled conflict by incentivizing young 
people to join militias. As always in the DRC, reliable and 
comprehensive data is hard to come by, and there are a number of 
significant variables to consider, making it difficult to quantify the true 
extent of the impact. However, what is clear is that official exports of 
the 3TGs plummeted in 2010 and 2011, and remain significantly below 
pre-2010 levels at the time of publication.  
The first SEC reports are due to be submitted by companies in 
May 2014. Time will tell whether the Act will be reduced to an annual 
tick-box exercise conducted by companies, or hold up as a substantive 
legal requirement leading to real change both in industry practice and on 
the ground.  
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4. THE PROJECT 
 
a) Overview of the Kazisafi/RITEWORK project 
 
The Kazisafi/RITEWORK project is designed to strengthen respect for 
worker rights in the ASM sector in the South Kivu and North Kivu 
provinces in the eastern DRC. The project had three main objectives: 
 
Objective One - Invest in the organizational and technical capacity 
of worker rights organizations to enable Congolese organizations to 
raise awareness of relevant laws and to provide workers with 
sustainable access to a range of protection and support services; 
 
Objective Two - Provide socio-economic support and alternative 
livelihood opportunities to exploited workers, addressing the 
immediate needs of these workers and facilitate livelihood 
diversification over the longer term; and 
 
Objective Three - Strengthen systems to promote identification and 
remediation of labor law violations in the ASM sector at the local, 
regional, and international levels. 
 
Over two years, Kazisafi/RITEWORK reached thousands of workers 
in DRC with its educational, training, capacity building and rights 
protection efforts. 
 
b) Key project partners 
 
 The larger Kazisafi/RITEWORK project, as well as the specific 
documentation initiative detailed here, are based on close coordination 
between HA and its three Congolese local partners. The documentation 
project was directed by Professor Daniel Rothenberg of Arizona State 
University and implemented by HA staff and the staff of ARAL, BEST 
and AJEDIKA. Some research and writing for the final report was with 
the assistance of additional consultants. Below is a brief description of 
the key institutional partners. 
 
Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights (HA) 
– HA’s mission is to protect human rights and respond to the human 
needs of vulnerable populations, especially the poor, isolated, and 
displaced, through comprehensive services defined by sensitivity to 
place and context and oriented towards solutions that lead to a more 
just global society.  The organization was founded in 1888 in Chicago. 
Over the years, it has developed to become one of the largest social 
services organizations in the Midwest with a focus on housing, health 
care, economic security, and legal protections, including running one of 
the most significant immigrant legal rights programs as well as one of 
31 
 
the best known torture victim treatment centers. As HA expanded its 
work internationally, it create Heartland Alliance International (HAI) 
which is also a service-based human rights organization that has become 
an industry leader in protecting victims of human trafficking; aiding 
women survivors of discrimination and violence; supporting sexual 
minorities; aiding survivors of trauma and torture; and serving the needs 
of the displaced, particularly indigenous and other ethnic and cultural 
minorities that have suffered systematic violence and discrimination. 
 
Arche d’Alliance (ARAL) – Founded in 2000, ARAL focuses on 
legal advocacy, community mediation and conflict resolution and has a 
presence in all of the main mining areas in South Kivu. ARAL monitors 
cases of worker exploitation in mining areas, providing direct legal 
assistance to workers, and advocating at the local, national and 
international levels for greater respect for worker rights in extractive 
industries. 
 
Association des Jeunes pour le Développement Intégré-Kalundu 
(AJEDIKA) – AJEDIKA was formed in 1988 by youth from Kalundu, 
South Kivu with the aim of advancing the rights of young people. In 
2005, AJEDIKA expanded its mandate to also cover worker rights, as a 
result of the exposure it had to these issues working with exploited 
children in the region’s mining areas. Since this time, to advance labor 
rights in the region AJEDIKA has specialized in conducting outreach 
and sensitization work, advocacy, and providing economic assistance 
and reintegration support. 
 
Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Technique (BEST) – Founded in 
1988, B.E.S.T. is a local organization with an excellent reputation for 
conducting high quality research, and with specialist expertise in the 
mining regions within proximity of Bukavu, specifically in Shabunda, 
Nzibira and Nyabibwe in the north of South Kivu. The Director of 
BEST, Reverend Didier de Failly, is a leading international expert on 
artisanal mining in the eastern DRC. 
 
Arizona State University (ASU) – ASU is the largest university 
in the U.S. in terms of the number of students. It has developed a new 
model for the American research university, creating an institution that 
is committed to interdisciplinarity, entrepreneurship, sustainability and 
global reach. This project specifically integrates the School of Politics 
and Global Studies (SPGS) and Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law’s 
Center for Law and Global Affairs (CLGA). SPGS is an integrated, 
multi-disciplinary program linking nationally recognized political 
scientists, sociologists and others with a focus on connecting academic 
rigor with practical applications. The CLGA supports and inspires 
research, education and practice regarding emerging forms of 
transnational governance that extend beyond the traditional paradigms 
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of international law with a commitment to linking ASU with field-based 
research and action throughout the world. The director of this project is 
on faculty at the SPGS and is the founding executive director of the 
CLGA. 
 
c) Overview of mine research sites 
 
 The Kazisafi/RITEWORK project focused the majority of its 
research in six mining site locations:  
 
Katogota – Situated at a distance of six kilometers from 
Katogota, the mining site known as Bulinga was discovered relatively 
recently, in 2009. This discovery was made by prospectors from 
Mwenga, who were invited to explore the area by the traditional leaders. 
The mining site follows very similar management procedures as the site 
at Lemera. There is a group of elders, nominated by the local king that 
acts under the king’s authority. Also nearby the site are the localities of 
Lubarika and Luvungi, forming along with Katogota a triangle around 
Bulinga. 
Bulinga is a cassiterite mine, home to a significant amount of 
activity given the site’s relatively small size. This can be explained by the 
fact that it is located approximately 50 kilometers south of Bukavu 
along a good road, therefore making it extremely easy to transport the 
minerals for sale to the trading houses in the provincial capital of South 
Kivu.  
However, access to water is a serious problem in Bulinga. 
Washing the minerals is a laborious process, involving the construction 
of irrigation tunnels to channel the water that comes through the 
mining tunnels themselves. The site has been running at maximum 
capacity since its discovery in 2009 and 46 separate tunnels have already 
been constructed. Recently, many of the miners have begun 
complaining about the difficulty of finding new mineral veins to follow. 
The site is the smallest of all the sites selected for the project, with only 
approximately 100 miners working in the tunnels. 
There are some reports that a certain amount of the cassiterite 
produced at Bulinga is smuggled into Burundi for sale to the 
international market. There is also an ongoing power struggle in the area 
concerning the traditional authorities, which have frequent changes in 
leadership. This in turn impacts the lives of the miners and the wider 
community, with many miners reporting poor local administration as a 
result of the unstable traditional power structure. 
 
Lemera – Lemera is a cassiterite mining site located 87 
kilometers north-west of Uvira in the Ruzizi plain, South Kivu. The site 
can be accessed in a 4x4 vehicle, requiring around a one hour drive on 
fairly rough terrain after leaving the main road that runs from Uvira to 
Bukavu. In August 2012, miners reported making between 15,000-
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20,000 Congolese francs ($17-22) per day. By August 2013 however, the 
daily income had reportedly dropped to between $3 and $5.  
The mining site at Lemera is divided into two main areas, 
Mugerero and Kagunga. Mugerero was discovered in 2006 following a 
prospection undertaken by a team on the invitation of the local 
‘mwami’, or king. Kagunga was discovered towards the end of 2008, at 
which point artisanal mining activity in Lemera began to move away 
from Mugerero and towards Kagunga, due in large part to the 
increasing frequency of pit collapses at Mugerero, often leading to the 
deaths of dozens of miners at a time.  
More recently however, a number of miners are beginning to 
return to the Mugerero to explore the possibility of constructing safer 
tunnels to start production once again. This is due in part to increased 
technical knowledge in the area regarding pit construction, and in part 
to an ever-growing fissure at the top of the Kagunga mining site, 
leading many to fear that soon the hillside will collapse, taking all the 
mining tunnels with it. 
Approximately 350 miners are active in Lemera, who, as of the 
time of writing, have yet to organize themselves under a mining 
cooperative. Instead, the site continues to be run by a committee of 
elders, nominated by the local king. State services - namely SAESSCAM 
and the Mining Police - operate alongside these traditional authorities.  
This overlap of state services with traditional authorities has 
created a degree of tension and led to a number of conflicts, as 
experienced by the report’s authors during visits to the site in 2012 and 
2013. For example, the local king gave one mining pit to the local auto-
defense group in return for the security the group provides the village. 
This decision was contested by the state services that see all the pits as 
being the property of the government. 
The security situation in Lemera is frequently threatened by the 
activities of various Mai-Mai groups operating in the area, which often 
intimidate and harass the local community and exhort money or 
minerals from the miners. The auto-defense groups exist and operate 
alongside, and often in collaboration with, the Congolese national army, 
in dispelling the threats presented by the Mai-Mai groups. 
Artisanal mining activity is the main livelihood activity in 
Lemera, which prior to the discovery of cassiterite in 2006 was – 
according to several local sources - a small, sleepy village. Today, it has 
developed into a larger settlement, which a thriving local market and a 
number of other small business activities existing alongside and thanks 
to mining activity. 
 
Mukela – The gold mining site of Mukela is located in Fizi 
territory in South Kivu province, 19 kilometers west of Fizi Centre, 55 
kilometers south-west of Baraka, and 149 kilometers south-west of 
Uvira. The mine has existed since colonial times. Some of the elder 
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habitants of Mukela still talk today about their work with the Belgians 
on the site in the 1950s.  
Today, Mukela is an important area, both as a passageway for 
those travelling to and from Minemebwe and for the buying and selling 
of the gold that is mined in the region. The mining site is composed of 
eleven different areas, of which the most active are Ma Boutique, 
Kasonge, Etats-Unis, Ka Wako, Itota, Lumanya, and Kcanga. 
According to the President of the Business Federation of 
Congo, who resides in Mukela, there are approximately 179 tunnels 
across the whole site, managed by approximately 150 tunnel owners. In 
May 2013, 420 miners were registered with various cooperatives, the 
most important of which are SOCOMIDEFI and COMICAF. 
Following the recent work of Heartland Alliance in the area, a certain 
number of miners are in the process of organizing themselves under a 
new cooperative to better serve their own interests. 
At the time of writing, mining has been temporarily suspended 
in the area under the order of the local authorities. Two principal 
reasons have been given for this temporary suspension. Firstly, as it’s 
the rainy season and mining in Mukela takes place alongside two main 
rivers (Mukela and Kasonge), pit collapses are frequent and so it’s in the 
best interests of the miners not to work during this period. 
Secondly, according to a FARDC officer in the 113th regiment 
based in Mukela, the temporary suspension is also to prevent the 
nocturnal activities of Mai Mai Yakutumba in the area. Throughout 
November 2013, there were a number of clashes between FARDC and 
Mai Mai Yakutumba. Consequently, the decision was taken to suspend 
mining activities while FARDC works to secure the area.  
Mai Mai Aleluya are another non-state armed group active in the 
area, and with direct interests in the gold site of Mukela. As in the other 
mining sites selected for this study, non-state armed groups and the 
national army operate alongside specialist state services (including 
SAESSCAM and the mining police) and traditional authorities.  
 
Mukungwe – Mukungwe is located on the Bukavu-Luhwinja 
road, passing through Burhinyi. The gold mining site is situated around 
eight kilometers outside of the commercial center of Mukungwe. Unlike 
the commercial centers in the other mining sites studied, the gold mined 
near Mukungwe is not sold in Mukungwe. The traditional commercial 
hubs for gold are found at nearby Butuza or Mugogo, where people 
prefer to do their business. 
Most people who visit the Mukungwe gold mining site do not 
spend the night there, due primarily to the tension exists between the 
traditional authorities and the fact that the area has been home to the 
Mai-Mai group Mudundu 40 during the numerous rebellions that have 
characterized South Kivu during previous decades. Mukungwe’s 
commercial center is a very poor area when compared with the other 
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areas of study, and depends on the economic activity of nearby Butuza 
for its survival.  
In contrast, the mining site itself appears better equipped than 
the other mining sites selected for this study. There are numerous 
generators and water pump machines dotted around the site that appear 
to be more powerful and of higher quality than in the other sites 
studied. To access the site, you must cross Chizi village before stopping 
at an even smaller village inhabited by the Rubango and Chunu families. 
Here, one must stop and request authorization to access the mining site. 
The final destination of the gold mined in Mukungwe is unclear. 
Many claim that the gold produced here is sold fraudulently, after being 
smuggled into Burundi or Rwanda. Gold mining is the main livelihood 
in the area, dating back many decades. There is little agriculture in the 
area, and some small businesses operating in and near the mining site 
itself to provide for the basic needs of the miners. 
The site is composed of three distinct areas, known as ‘centers’ 
by the miners. Each center is headed up by a boss, and each boss 
belongs to one of the site's two ruling families, the title holders of the 
land. Each boss closely tracks all the people living in and coming in and 
out of his center, including visitors, and submits daily reports to the 
ruling families. The ruling families have a surveillance committee to 
closely monitor all of the site's workers. This surveillance committee 
operates with complete impunity and, as with the bosses of each center, 
reports directly to the ruling families. 
Each center is home to a number of small shops, restaurants, 
guesthouses, as well as some small livestock. There are also a number of 
brothels in each center. The majority of the miners in Mukungwe come 
from Bukavu, Walungu and Mwenga. The artisanal miners from 
Mwenga have perhaps the strongest presence in the area, and many of 
these include miners who used to work for the Congolese mining 
company Sominki in the old gold mine at Kamituga. They bring with 
them a specialist expertise in constructing safe and well-functioning 
galleries, which perhaps in part explains the higher level of equipment 
observed in this area when compared with others. 
The miners work in long, horizontal galleries of up to 100 
miners, and report working day and night. The miners consist of sub-
groups of specialists, including machinists (responsible for the operation 
and maintenance of generators, motor-pumps and other small-scale 
machinery used in the process of artisanal mineral exploitation), 
purifiers, diggers, blasters (who prepare and set-up explosives), and 
chemical specialists.  
Through this chain of workers, the mineral is extracted and then 
taken by porters' to be washed and treated.  From here, the minerals 
leave the site, again through porters, and disappear up the supply chain 
on their way through the middle-men to the trading houses and 
international markets. 
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The site is characterized by ownership conflicts dating back 
more than a decade. Initially this conflict was between the ruling 
families and the traditional authorities. Today, these two camps find 
themselves up against a third-party with competing claims to their own; 
the Canadian mining company, BANRO. According to the mining 
company, the site belongs to one of its concessions.  
In response to these conflicts and to better defend their 
interests, the ruling families called in the national army. Deployed under 
the pretext of providing security to the workers against potential attacks 
from armed rebel groups, in reality the soldiers appear to extort a 
percentage of all the minerals coming out of the mine while also 
claiming a right to be provided by the workers with a daily ration for 
their survival. 
The presence of specialized state services such as SAESSCAM 
or the mining police is minimal, with no fixed offices in the area. This is 
one explanatory factor for the high level of smuggling across borders 
associated with Mukungwe. However, the recent attention on the 
legality and transparency of the mining sector in the eastern DRC 
appears to have resulted in increased state attention to the area. There 
are also tentative signs that the miners are being to organize under a 
cooperative, but at the time of writing, no mining cooperative exists in 
the area. 
 
Nyabibwe – The commercial center of Nyabibwe is situated 
approximately 100 kilometers north of Bukavu on the main road 
between Bukavu and Goma, in the territory of Kalehe, South-Kivu. The 
main mining site in the area is a cassiterite mine called Kalimbi, situated 
around five kilometers south of Nyabibwe. As of February 2013, the 
mining cooperatives in Nyabibwe registered 1,294 miners working at 
the site (Matthysen & Montejano, 2013), originating from areas all over 
North and South Kivu. Being close to the Rwandan border, 
Kinyarwanda is the most commonly heard language in the mining site, 
followed by Kihavu and Kiswahili.  
The Kalimbi mining site is operational 24 hours a day, and is 
divided into two main areas, known as T20 and Koweït. T20 is home to 
the tunnel known locally as ‘maternity’, due to the considerable amount 
of cassiterite it produces. Most of the miners work in this tunnel, which 
has only one entry point, and approximately twenty galleries inside. 
‘Maternity’ produced around five tons of cassiterite per day before the 
Presidential suspension in September 2010. Koweït is situated beneath 
T20, alongside the main road as you approach Nyabibwe from the 
south.  
There are two mining cooperatives in Kalimbi, with a short but 
troubled history: Coopérative minière pour le Bien-être des 
Communautés de Kalehe (COMBECKA) and Coopérative Minière de 
Kalimbi (COMIKA). Since their inception in 2010, the two 
cooperatives have continually contested control of the different tunnels 
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that make up Kalimbi. The situation has improved recently, and most 
miners working in Kalimbi are affiliated with one or the other of the 
cooperatives, with very few working independently. Another source of 
tension stems from the Canadian mining company Shamika Resources’ 
exploration permit, signed in 2007 by the Ministry of Mines.  
The site is arguably, alongside Bisie in North Kivu, the most 
well-known mining site among members of the international 
community. In recent years the government and national army have 
regained control of the area, and it has become the pilot site for a 
number of conflict mineral initiatives aimed at cleaning up the mineral 
supply chain and improving transparency (discussed in Section 2. 
above). Its selection for these initiatives is no doubt due in large part to 
its proximity to Bukavu and Goma. A return visit by vehicle along safe 
and reasonably well-constructed roads is possible in one day, making it a 
relatively accessible location in comparison to the vast majority of 
mining sites in the Kivu provinces, which are found in far more isolated 
areas. 
While significant attention has been paid to the establishment of 
conflict mineral initiatives at Kalimbi, the author’s two site visits carried 
out in June and December of 2013 found ‘Maternity’ to be closed due 
to flooding. During both visits, the machine to evacuate water was 
broken down, with several sources confirming that no one could get 
together the $1,000 needed to repair the machine and draw the water 
out. As a result, hundreds of miners were not going to work, and were 
either struggling to make ends meet, or had moved on to mine 
elsewhere. That such a relatively small sum (considering the potential 
daily production value of the site) takes more than several weeks to find 
should be of concern to local and international stakeholders working to 
ensure the success of current pilot initiatives.  
Nevertheless, the site began producing ‘conflict-free’ cassiterite 
in 2012 and – despite concerns raised from advocacy organizations such 
as Global Witness of FARDC’s continued involvement in mineral trade 
from the area – continues to do so to this day. The success or otherwise 
of the pilot schemes being implemented in Nyabibwe will determine the 
extent to which these initiatives are expanded to cover other artisanal 
mining areas located in the Kivu provinces. 
 
Nzibira – Nzibira is a mining area home to wolfram, gold and 
cassiterite located in the administrative territory of Walungu, 
approximately 75 kilometers west of Bukavu in South Kivu, on the 
Bukavu-Shabunda road. It is relatively easily accessible, with public 
transport frequently going to and from Nzibira from Bukavu on a daily 
basis. 
The two commercial centers of Nzibira – Kankinda and 
Chaminyagu – are well known in Bukavu, as many people from the 
provincial capital have at one point or another spent some time in 
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Nzibira due to the high level of mineral activity in the area. The main 
languages spoken in the area are Mashi and Kiswahili. 
Alongside the mineral production of Nzibira there are a number 
of thriving small businesses (owned on the whole by elderly men), as 
well as numerous restaurants and bars run and staffed by women, many 
of whom also work as prostitutes. There is a low level of agricultural 
activity, but the main economic activity in the area is mining.  
Most miners in Nzibira are young men, and the vast majority are 
from Bukavu, Walungu town, and the neighboring villages of Nzibira. 
There is a lack of technical expertise relating to pit construction, even 
though many of them work in extremely deep mines. There are also a 
number of women working in the area with the miners, who wait to 
transport quartz stones from the mines to the town center to break 
them down.  
There are several different mining sites at Nzibira, of which the 
mains ones are Zola-Zola, Chaminyagu, Muhinga, Mushangi, and 
Bushushu. The largest site, Zola-Zola, is an old mining site that was 
previously exploited by the industrial mining company Sominki. Some 
of the remains of this industrial exploitation can still be seen today, such 
as the old iron pipes that carried water to where the minerals were 
washed. 
Today, the Canadian mining company BANRO is in the process 
of exploring the Zola-Zola site, to the concern of the artisanal miners 
working there. A level of confusion exists as to why a gold mining 
company would explore a cassiterite mine. Zola-Zola itself is divided 
into two main sites, Zola and D23. The mines flood frequently and 
there is a general lack of adequate machinery to withdraw the water, 
meaning the mines are often closed for weeks at a time. 
Before the Presidential suspension in September 2010, Zola-
Zola alone was producing around three tons of cassiterite per day. Since 
the suspension and the passing of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(see Section 2. above), mining activity has greatly reduced in the area, 
with many miners either returning home or moving to other mining 
sites, particularly into gold which has been less impacted by the wave of 
recent anti-conflict mineral initiatives.  
At the time of writing, the only authorized mining cooperative 
in Nzibira is the Coopérative Minière des Exploitants Artisanaux 
(COMIDEA). In early 2012, many miners accused the cooperative’s 
committee of only serving its own interests rather than the interests of 
the miners. They said they would prefer to establish their own 
cooperative to represent their own needs (this is a complicated, 
bureaucratic and expensive process, requiring approval of 
documentation in Kinshasa). However, a year later, the situation 
appeared to have much improved, with COMIDEA having grown 
greatly in popularity due to its increased commitment to improving the 
working conditions and daily lives of miners. 
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The area experiences frequent insecurity, resulting from clashes 
between FARDC and Raia Mutomboki. In early 2013, these clashes 
caused the majority of the civilian population to stay at home. Lately, 
the situation appears to have calmed down with the increased presence 
of FARDC in the area leading to the retreat of Raia Mutomboki into the 
neighboring villages. Each day, the miners have to put aside a certain 
amount of money or cassiterite to pay a military ‘ration’ to the FARDC 
unit operating in the area. Traditional authorities are also present in the 
area, and have a certain level of influence and control over the mining 
sector in Nzibira. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Nzibira has been chosen as one 
of the several areas where a ‘center de negoce’, or trading center, is to 
be created as part of a region-wide effort to tackle mineral fraud and 
improve transparency in the sector. However, this center has yet to 
become operational in any real sense. 
 
d) Methodology and data collection 
 
The documentation initiative within the Kazisafi/RITEWORK 
project is designed to provide insight into the lived experience of miners 
and others as a means of effectively understanding the nature of human 
rights violations within the industry.  
The project involves four interrelated actions implemented over 
an 18-month period. The first element of the project involved 
consultations with HA staff and the staff of ARAL, BEST and 
AJEDIKA as a means of developing a context appropriate system of 
data collection and documentation. This was followed by methodology 
training of relevant Kazisafi/RITEWORK staff, HA staff and those 
working with local partners. The goal here was to ensure that the 
information collected would be consistent and focused, allowing for the 
effective documentation of the experiences of miners and others. As 
described below, the methodology focuses on collecting information on 
case studies of violations experienced by miners and others in the six 
field sites as well as collecting oral histories from the field that provide 
broad documentation of how the artisanal mining system operates in 
the areas studied. 
The third component of the project involves ongoing data 
collection and analysis activities. This process defined the majority of 
the project activities. These actions were integrated with the other 
Kazisafi/RITEWORK actions and built on close integration between 
Congolese partners and miners and mining communities in the project 
sites. The data collection was based on multiple site visits to all areas 
and careful review and consultation processes. In general, data 
collection was managed with limited serious obstacles, largely because 
the local partner organizations have, over time, established effective 
relations with mining communities. The quality of data ranged in 
relation to the miners presenting their oral histories and specific 
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complaints. In many cases, the material gathered is rich with detail and 
insight and, in other cases, the material is less conclusive in terms of 
facts and adequate review of context and actions. However, as a general 
rule, the project researchers were able to collect high quality data on 
multiple cases from multiple individuals in all of the sites studied.    
The final stage in the process involves reviewing and analyzing 
the case study and oral history data. The documentation and analysis 
decouples the data from identifying information regarding those 
interviewed in the field. The process links the creation of a database of 
key violations from the case study data with narrative reviews of the 
violations documented. The database references violations, responsible 
parties, sites, core biographical data (age, gender, etc.) and allows for 
analysis by site and other criteria. The process also includes collating 
and editing the oral histories for review and publication. And, the 
analysis links this fieldwork data with a review of existing laws and 
regulations. Overall, the process has enabled a set of conclusions and 
recommendations that are grounded in detailed field data that 
documents the lived experience of miners and others in the key areas 
studied within the eastern DRC. 
 
Case Studies – The collection of case studies was managed by the 
HA staff in coordination with the project director. The material was 
collected by HA staff and staff from ARAL, BEST and AJEDIKA 
during their multiple field site visits. The visits were consistent, but also 
limited in duration and number by the logistical difficulties of the 
distance and time required to access the mines, as the well as insecurity 
which occasionally prevented travel to the areas. As a result, visits to the 
sites shifted between weekly, bi-monthly and monthly. The overall 
regularity of field data collection allowed for broad-based data gathering 
from multiple sources that provide a useful overview of the experience 
of labor and human rights violations in the mines.  
While the initial project envisioned collecting 50 to 75 case 
studies, the project team collected 133 case studies. In part this is the 
result of the successful training of local partners as well as a sign of their 
capacity to effectively conduct field research in a challenging 
environment. Of these case studies, 133 were male and five female. The 
ages of those interviewed range from 14 to 61, with a median age of 27. 
In total, 100 of the case studies were recorded in South Kivu by 
AJEDIKA and BEST, and 33 in North Kivu, by ARAL. 
The case studies range in complexity and detail. Where possible, 
the research teams followed up on specific allegations to consult 
multiple witnesses and also to determine from interviews with crew 
bosses, mine bosses, mine police and others the specifics of what 
occurred.  
The overall goal of the case study methodology is to allow 
miners and others to present what they view as core violations and 
issues of concern. These do not always meet the definition of legal 
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violations, yet they appropriately express issues of concern to miners 
and others working in the industry. In fact, to a large degree, miners and 
others appear relatively unfamiliar with their technical legal rights and 
the specific provisions of defining international and domestic law. Many 
are unaware of the various rules and regulations that are meant to apply 
and focus instead on what they perceive to be as injustices and acts of 
repression and harm. 
Below is a brief narrative overview of four different case studies 
collected by the project. The initials presented are proxies for actual 
names and the term “XX” references cases where miners preferred 
anonymity. A brief review of this material helps illustrate the value of 
this methodology and the diversity and complexity of the claims made 
by those working in the artisanal mining industry (a more detailed 
analysis of this material is found in Section 5). 
 
BD and M went to explore the possibility of working in 
a tunnel where mining had been forbidden due to its 
close proximity to the main road. During their trip, they 
were discovered by a FARDC military unit on patrol. 
Instead of moving the miners on, the unit agreed that 
BD & M could work there throughout the night under 
the soldiers’ security, in return for an equal share of the 
mineral production in the morning. When morning 
came, the miners stayed back in the tunnel, hoping that 
the soldiers would get bored and go away. However, the 
soldiers waited, and became impatient. Fed up with 
waiting, the soldiers gathered grass and wood to fill the 
tunnel entrance, and then set the entrance on fire. 
Rather than suffocate from the fumes, the miners came 
out of the tunnel. While M managed to escape, BD was 
arrested and thrown in the military jail. Five days later, 
he paid a $45 fine for his release.36  
            
Over the course of twenty years of mining experience, 
XX had saved enough money to buy a machine to draw 
water out of the mines, when they began to flood during 
the rainy season. He rented this machine out to different 
mining sites in the Walungu territory for $10 a day. In 
June 2013, a mining boss from Muhinga called XX and 
asked to rent his machine, and XX duly agreed. 
However, the noise made by the machine was overheard 
by soldiers from the non-state armed group Raia 
Mutomboki, who were based nearby. The soldiers 
descended on the site and confiscated the machine. The 
mining boss who had rented the machine bought the 
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armed men drinks and tried to talk them into returning 
it to him, but in vain. The armed men demanded to 
speak with the owner, and when XX arrived, they tried 
to intimidate him and threaten him with arrest. 
Eventually, XX was made to pay the armed men $20 to 
get his machine back. Following the incident, miners at 
Muhinga were too scared to use machines in case the 
incident repeated itself. As a result, the mine flooded, 
and at the time of writing is no longer operational.37 
      
On the night of July 28th 2013, 26-year-old KB was 
working in the Koweit mine as usual. He went into the 
mine to dig for cassiterite. However, he didn’t come out 
as expected, so a number of his colleagues went into the 
tunnel he was working in to look for him. A little way in, 
they noticed that the tunnel had collapsed and was 
blocked. They worked quickly to clear the blockage, and 
in so doing, found KB’s body. He had died from a 
mining collapse, as confirmed by SAESSCAM, the 
mining cooperatives, and the police. He left behind him 
his wife and two children.38 
           
XX wanted to join some other women in the area, who 
had begun work sifting through the abandoned rock 
produced by miners to try and find some cassiterite and 
earn a little money. To be able to access the abandoned 
rock, the pit boss told XX she would have to sleep with 
him. When XX started working, the pit boss then 
imposed a tax on the small quantities of cassiterite that 
she managed to find. The local authorities also impose a 
special tax on all women working in the mining site, 
simply because they are women. Women who refuse to 
pay this tax are summoned in front of the traditional 
authorities and sometimes even the military. XX is then 
only allowed to sell the little cassiterite that remains after 
she’s paid these taxes to one specific buyer, unlike the 
men. This buyer – or ‘shashuleur’ – doesn’t use scales to 
weigh the minerals, but instead simply estimates and 
buys at the price he wants; often well under what the 
women report to be the true weight and value of the 
cassiterite.39 
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One key value of this approach is that it highlights the ways in 
which miners and others accept some modes of harm as so 
commonplace as to not constitute issues worth bringing to the attention 
of investigators while other issues are routinely discussed. Above all, the 
case studies reveal a clear moral sensibility among miners, porters, 
washers and others that link their lived experience with their 
understandings of acts of harm and issues that should be addressed to 
improve their lives. 
 
Oral Histories – The project methodology also included gathering 
a number of detailed oral histories as a means of effectively 
documenting the lived experience of miners and others. The initial work 
plan envisioned 10 detailed final oral histories, but the project team 
collected 51, revealing both the effective nature of the training and the 
skills of the researchers. 
The oral history methodology allows the experiences of miners 
and others to be contextualized within a larger life history. This helps to 
explain how Congolese end up in the mining industry. The tales tend to 
link miners, porters and washers with a variety of life stories. 
Some describe how issues in their personal life led them to 
mining, like a young man fleeing the angry father of his high school 
girlfriend:  
 
I studied at the Institute of Lwiro. In 2004, during my 
second year, I got a girl from Katana pregnant.  
 
The girl’s father tried to have me put in the prison.  
 
So, I quit school and fled.  
 
I went to Walikale where I managed a bar. I would travel 
back and forth from Walikale to Bukavu to purchase 
drinks. 
 
Then, in 2007, I became a miner.40  
 
Or, a man who loved school but had to go to work so his 
brother could proceed with his studies: 
 
I was born in Lubona in Walungu. My father and my 
mother had nine children, five boys and four girls. My 
father was a carpenter and then a butcher, slaughtering 
cows in the market. He died in 1999, but my mother is 
still alive, although she is very old.  
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I loved school. When I finished my third year of 
secondary school, my brother was in college. My parents 
said they didn’t have enough money to pay for my 
brother and me. They asked me to leave school to give 
my brother a chance. Unfortunately he didn’t live long 
after he completed his studies.41 
 
Or, a woman who goes to the mines after her unfaithful 
husband leaves her with young children to care for: 
 
I am Mwenga from the area of Burega. I was a small 
business owner until I married my husband who is from 
Nzibira. 
 
After a while, my husband was unfaithful.  
 
He made me suffer. Four years later, he abandoned me.  
 
I had no way to earn a living and support my four 
children. 
 
So, eight months ago, I went to the Zola Zola mine. I 
went to work hard and to see if laboring in the mines 
would help me to survive in this difficult situation.42 
 
The oral history methodology also allows for a detailed review 
of how the artisanal mining industry operates, from the ways in which 
miners are charged for money and minerals: 
 
I am only able to sell a portion of the cassiterite that I 
take out of the mines.  
  
Let me explain.  
  
When I take a bag from the tunnel, I first have to give a 
tenth to the mine owner.  Out of what is left, I give fifty 
percent to the crew boss. That leaves me with half of 
what I mined. This I have to sell to my crew boss at a 
very low price. I sell him my cassiterite for $3 per 
kilogram. But, I know that they sell the cassiterite for $5 
per kilogram. So, I lose $2 per kilogram. Then, from 
what he pays me for the minerals, he deducts expenses 
like food and the costs of the bags we use. Sometimes 
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the crew boss invents expenses I don’t understand that 
add up to a lot of money. 
  
In the end, I hardly make $50.  
  
So, after I have some drinks with my friends, all the 
money is gone. 
  
Then, I go back into the mines.43  
 
As well as distinctions in the experience by ethnicity: 
 
The Hutus are the crew bosses. This is why the miners 
that are treated the best are the Hutus. They are given 
the easiest jobs. 
 
It is the Bahavu people who do the hardest work: 
transporting, crushing, and washing the minerals. When 
the tunnels are dirty, it is the Bahavu that are required by 
the crew bosses to clear out the garbage. Three times, I 
refused to do this. So, the crew boss refused to let me to 
enter the mine to work.44 
 
And, also marked differences in how women are treated, particularly 
given systematic gender discrimination and multiple cases of sexual 
violence and coercion: 
  
Women do not have permission to enter the mine 
because they say that if they did, the mine would 
become barren. So, women are porters and washers. We 
get up very early in the morning to go bring the bags to 
the tunnels. The miners fill the bags with minerals. 
Then, the women take them to the river to wash.45 
 
This methodology also allows for an engagement with how 
miners and others experience their work and lives in a manner that 
extends beyond a recitation of violations. While artisanal mining is a 
difficult, if not brutal, industry, the tens if not hundreds of thousands 
working in the field have lives of no less complexity and dignity than 
others with the good fortune to have the opportunity to labor in less 
dangerous fields. Listening to the voices of miners and others deepens 
the understanding of what the field is really like: 
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Sometimes we enter the mines on our knees or on our 
stomachs. We don’t enter standing up. We call ourselves 
“mice” because we move around in all sorts of 
positions, on our backs, even on our heads.46 
 
At times, the oral histories provide striking specificity and detail of the 
actual mining experience: 
 
This work is hard, but I am used to it. We enter the 
tunnels, crawling on our bellies. We carry things 
attached to our hips. It is hard. I have scars on my belly 
and sides. We dig on our bellies, kneeling or sitting. But, 
since there are no other jobs, I keep mining. 
 
I work in a tunnel called Koweït. It is different from 
other sites. When you get inside, you find a lot of 
tunnels. Then, you have to choose the tunnel which you 
think has the most minerals. Inside, there is not enough 
air. If the pump is down, you can’t even enter the 
tunnel. I would rather starve above ground than die of 
asphyxiation in a tunnel. And, sometimes, the tunnel fills 
up with the water. Imagine what it is like when the water 
reaches up to your waist. When this happens, it is really 
hard to work. When this happens, we can go as much as 
three days without working. The crew bosses ask us to 
drain the water from the tunnel. After we do that, we 
start working again. 
 
Some of my friends have died. This happens when the 
tunnels collapse. Then, miners can’t find their way back 
and they die.  
 
I work all night long. In the morning, I come up with 
what I have found. During the day, I put the minerals in 
the sun and rest. After I sell the minerals, I pay my debts 
and take half of the money for my wife to meet the 
needs of the family.47 
 
And, it is also true as regards the self-reflection and emotional and 
intellectual engagement with work and life that defines miners just as it 
does countless others. Given the brutality of the industry and the fact 
that research on mining is commonly conducted by those unfamiliar 
with making a living from such difficult labor, these issues are often lost 
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in research reports on the field. Yet, miners and others speak in a 
manner that broadens the sense of engagement with the complexity of 
their work: 
   
But, I persevere.  
 
The mines are very dangerous, but we enter without 
fear.  
 
Because of the challenges we face, one becomes wise. 
 
Experience in the mines brings wisdom.48 
 
Overall, the methodology helps broaden the documentation of 
violations in the artisanal mining industry so these are seen as intimately 
integrated into the complex lives of Congolese working in the field. 
 
5. FINDINGS 
 
a) Understanding the experience of artisanal mining 
 
Artisanal mining is difficult and dangerous work. Every aspect 
of the labor is physically demanding – digging into the earth, crawling 
down small tunnels, the passage illuminated by a flashlight strapped to 
one’s head, carrying heavy bags of rock and minerals, crushing stones by 
hand, washing, sorting, packing and stacking. What allows the industry 
to function based as it is on grueling hand labor is the fact that 
compensation is relatively low in relation to the value of the minerals 
extracted. Yet, woven into the system are multiple players – crew 
bosses, the military, various state agents, traditional authorities, armed 
groups, buyers and middlemen – each of whom extract a portion of the 
value of the minerals extracted as they move their way from the hills of 
the eastern DRC to sites of export, both legal and illegal, and eventually 
to smelters and then into multiple supply chains leading to products 
consumed around the world.  
As outlined above, there is substantive DRC legislation that 
provides protections for fundamental human rights as well as specific 
laws that regulate the artisanal mining industry. There are also a number 
of general state institutions designed, at least in theory, to provide for 
general social order including the FARDC and national and provincial 
police as well as mining-specific bodies, such as mining police, 
SAESSCAM and cooperatives all of whom are supposed to protect 
miners rights and ensure that the industry is appropriately regulated.  
Despite the rather significant legal and institutional mechanisms 
in the DRC to regulate artisanal mining, the industry is complexly 
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informal. That is, the actual operation of mines and the ways in which 
mining supports multiple players within the region exists largely outside 
of the rule of law. This does not mean that the laws have no significance 
or that state institutions have no authority, but rather that the ways in 
which minerals are extracted, separated from rock, sold, transported, re-
sold, further processed and eventually exported operates in a manner 
that enables, if not encourages, practices that are prohibited by existing 
regulations. And, many of these practices represent serious human 
rights violations and abuses.  
Above all, while the specifics of mine control and associated 
violations vary significantly from one mine site to another and from one 
region to another, the overall system is structured such that the multiple 
parties that wield power each manage to extract value from the industry.  
In many cases, the efforts of these empowered entities exist in 
competition with each other and in other cases, they work in tandem. 
Yet, the system is varied enough that while in one mine the FARDC 
may work closely with mine police and mine bosses, in another mine, 
these forces may be in conflict with each other. Or, the relations may be 
even more fluid such that particular cases of power struggles shift over 
time or in relation to a specific situation, such that the FARDC or 
national police may fully support one mine boss and not another in one 
case and not in another or may act differently in terms of what they 
demand in certain circumstances and not others.  
State authorities commonly work alongside, in tandem and in a 
complexly coordinated fashion with various non-state actors, such as 
traditional authorities. This is even sometimes true with various armed 
groups that operate throughout the region, although clearly 
documenting this type of collusion is difficult.  
Unpacking the processes through which empowered actors in 
the mining system collaborate is challenging. This is largely because the 
particular nature of these relations, while ubiquitous within the system, 
varies widely in its specific function. The particular roles, powers, 
monetary significance and mechanisms of control shift by mine site, 
region, the presence of state and non-state armed groups, infrastructure 
and other factors. Sometimes these processes reveal unifying patterns 
and other times they suggest a high level of improvisation  
When listening to miners and others working in and around the 
mines, one hears multiple tales of abuse, including some quite horrific 
stories. Yet, one also learns of a complex relation between these 
individuals to the rather intricate system of mineral extraction, transport 
and sale. That is, miners and others experience the work from within 
the context of their social reality. Ultimately, working in mining is a 
livelihood strategy. This means that Congolese who dig in the mines, 
carry minerals, wash them and separate rock from minerals seek to 
support themselves and their families as best as they can. Assisting these 
workers requires embracing this fact, which is sometimes lost in the 
many excellent studies of the industry and may also be absent in the 
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broader policies designed to minimize harm and human suffering within 
the artisanal mines. 
 Some miners and mine related workers see their labor as a net 
positive in terms of providing for their needs and the needs of their 
families. Others see the industry and their experiences as one of 
constant victimization within a system that is brutal and predatory. One 
reason why it is useful to listen to the miners is that both of these 
perspectives are correct. The abuses are real, yet are experienced 
complexly by different individuals in various ways, but always as filtered 
through local understanding. Our project suggests that the voices of 
these individuals, and their opinions and ideas, are equally valid, 
regardless of how they judge themselves and the worlds in which they 
struggle to survive. 
Often when reading reports on artisanal mining by international 
organizations, the presentation of violence, abuse and excess is so 
constant that the reader is left wondering why anyone would ever work 
in a mine in North or South Kivu. In fact, many thousands, perhaps 
hundreds of thousands (De Souza, 2007; Pact, 2010), do this work. This 
does not invalidate the stories of extraordinary abuse that characterize 
the industry. Nor does it suggest that there is any inaccuracy in these 
reports. Rather, listening to the voices of miners suggests a more 
complex picture in which the experiences of different miners and others 
working in the field vary widely and that while severe acts of violence 
are common in some areas they are not so common in other areas.  
This helps explain why people work in the mines. It is not only 
desperation and work conducted at the point of a gun; but rather a form 
of survival in a part of the world that has been ravaged by conflict, 
endemic poverty and political instability. Yet, within this world, 
individual Congolese, their families and their communities struggle to 
do the best they can, often choosing to work in mines because this 
appears to them, and may turn out to be, the best choice. 
As one miner explains, “It is true that this is stressful, painful 
and hard work, but it pays a bit if you have good luck.”49 Another miner 
describes how his work has allowed him to seek to offset the terrible 
economic losses of his family as a result of the conflict:  
 
My parents are poor. My father had cows and goats, but 
due to war, he lost everything. With what I earn in the 
mines, I have already bought my father a cow. With 
God’s help, I intend to buy him more. And, through this 
work, I can pay the school fees for my two little 
brothers. I am improving my life. I have some land in 
Nabibwe. I will get married and build a house, like some 
of my colleagues. The city of Nyabibwe is based on 
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mining and there are many miners who have built 
houses here.50 
 
A 45 year-old miner with eight children left a stable job as a teacher to 
labor in the mines, seeing this shift as a significant financial benefit: 
 
This is an activity that makes money. When I was 
teaching I couldn’t imagine holding a $100 bill. Today, I 
have saved over $1000. Before, my wife had never worn 
a dress that cost more than $10, but now I can buy her 
one that costs $50 . . . Six of my children study with 
three going to college. I have no difficulty paying their 
school fees or expenses. I praise God for leading me to 
this job.51 
 
While the benefits and even pleasures of mining are rarely discussed in 
the literature, it is important to consider the positive aspects of mining 
from the perspective of workers, including both the capacity to earn 
more than in other lines of work and the excitement of finding 
minerals, the pride in the work and the potential of possibly doing quite 
well: 
 
No, I cannot give up the profession of creuseur. When 
one finds minerals, there is great joy! But one cannot 
forget that luck plays a big role in this work.52 
 
In addition, within the context of the eastern DRC, there are cases 
where mining, dangerous as it is, is safer and more certain than other 
jobs, especially those involving security and work with various state and 
non-state armed groups:  
 
After secondary school, I took a course in how to be a 
security guard. I was worried because the war was 
everywhere. There were bandits and rebels and I realized 
that I needed to do something constructive. 
  
After my training, I came to Nyabibwe where I worked 
for a few years as a security guard. I had to intervene in 
difficult situations when there were problems. At certain 
points during the height of the war, the risks were 
simply too great.  This was around 2006 or 2007.  
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I met a Hutu friend who told me about the work in the 
mines. He was a digger himself.  
 
So, I resigned from my job and I started digging in the 
mines.53 
 
Many miners are former combatants some of whom fought with 
multiple armed groups, including those who switched sides. For some, 
the often violent and informal nature of mining seems linked to their 
years of life amidst conflict. For example a 31-year-old miner who was 
orphaned by the conflict, lived in the street and later became a child 
soldier describes his embrace of a common culture of the mines which 
links sudden infusions of cash with widespread drinking, prostitution 
and petty crime. He is known as “Ruthless”, in part from his years as a 
brutal combatant and, “because I do not like to joke. The one who plays 
with me, I might even kill.”54 The mines provide him with access to 
money, even if it is uncertain and its benefits fleeting:  
 
I work day and night to win either $5 or $10, or even 
nothing. But there are days when I earn $50 to $ 200.  
When I have my money, I’m in the center of Nzibira to 
drink with my friends.  
 
Yes, everyone loves women, even you I'm sure . . .  Here 
we have only beer and women . . .  
 
Excuse me, because I have to go to work, because today 
I must find money to have beer tomorrow.55 
 
Alongside those who see mining as appealing, or at least the 
best of available livelihood options, there are many who find the 
industry demeaning, dangerous, violent and a form of work to avoid. 
Many Congolese try artisanal mining and then leave to seek other forms 
of earning a living. Some are injured, at times severely.  Some suffer 
terrible acts of violence, such as beatings, forced labor and sexual 
assault. Others are damaged by the hardships and abuse of the industry, 
or leave humiliated and angry.  
Given the difficulty of artisanal mining, many wish they had 
different options, “What I need is to find another way to earn a living 
and provide for my family, something without so much risk.”56 
What is clear is that artisanal mining is a difficult form of labor 
defined by constant competition and struggle. It is fundamentally 
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uncertain and marked by multiple risks and abuses. Miners and other 
mine workers are often abused and continually reminded of their 
vulnerability and the ongoing competition between everyone in the 
industry, “It’s a world of fish. The big fish eat the little fish.”57 
 
b) Multiple authorities  
 
The lives of miners, porters, washers, crushers, sorters and 
others are positioned within a complex and divergent network of 
different authorities. By authorities here, we mean those that effectively 
manage power within the actual context of mineral extraction in the 
region. These include formal representatives of state power – FARDC, 
mining police, national police, local government officials, SAESSCAM 
staff and others – as well as those who wield power outside of state 
structures including traditional chiefs, non-state armed groups, crew 
bosses, mine bosses, mine owners and others.  
While legally there is a significant distinction between state and 
non-state actors, especially as regards the process of implementing laws 
and regulations and adhering to a commitment to enabling the rule of 
law, within the actual artisanal mining industry and from the experience 
of miners and others, what matters more is who wields power where 
they live and work, rather than the source of their authority. In fact, one 
might argue that a key characteristic of artisanal mining in the eastern 
DRC is that it depends to a great deal on the management of power, but 
within a context in which there are multiple, distinct, competing and 
cooperating systems of authority where the state and its agents are 
clearly not in full control. 
Among the array of authorities responsible for supervising, 
supporting and organizing artisanal mining activity in the sites selected 
for this study, none were exempt from committing violations in a 
systematic manner that significantly impacts miners and others. Based 
on our review of the data, we have classified these groups as: FARDC; 
other government officials, which includes mining police, national 
police, SAESSCAM, local officials, and others; traditional authorities; 
non-state armed groups, which in this research generally references 
covers M-23, FDLR and a number of Mai-Mai groups; cooperatives; 
and mine bosses.  
These different groups’ actions structure the lives of miners and 
others through multiple acts that link the provision of a form of order 
with a generalized sense of disempowerment and uncertainty. In the 
most severe cases, these actors engage in severe violence and repression, 
including beatings, torture, and extralegal imprisonment. Even where 
violence is not used, empowered forces ensure that miners and others 
experience a generalized sense of impotence, uncertainty and 
informality. Within this context, threats are common (possibly making 
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violence unnecessary), dangerous conditions are the norm and the theft 
of wages and minerals is widely experienced alongside refusals to honor 
employment agreements and pay full wages. Those with authority at 
multiple levels extract payments in the form of illegal “taxes” and 
through other systems. And what dominates the industry is a near 
complete lack of accountability such that the structures of power that 
define artisanal mining in the region are infused with impunity, 
mirroring the governance problems of larger DRC.  
Interestingly, the group for which we received the greatest 
number of complaints most overwhelmingly associated with labor and 
human rights violations in the recorded case studies is mine bosses. This 
group – comprising either the team leaders who manage a group of 
around a dozen miners or the tunnel owners – was implicated in 51 
percent of the recorded case studies.  Many miners described the 
negative impact that the informality of the industry had on their lives. 
Miners, porters, crushers, washers and others who provide the key hand 
labor for the artisanal mining industry consistently described their 
vulnerability at the hands of mine bosses: 
 
The work we do is not based on a formal agreement. 
The mine bosses do not see us as employees, but rather 
as someone to help him. They give us a place to work, 
but no one is there to protect us.58 
 
All of the mining sites under study experienced violations 
associated with mine bosses. The most frequent violation was wage 
underpayment, often significant, or non-payment for an extended 
period of time. This was often linked to the indebtedness of the team 
boss or pit owner associated with the violation, highlighting the 
complex web of relationships in artisanal mining whereby mining bosses 
are pre-financed by ‘negotiants’, or buyers, to conduct pre-production 
exploration work (such as tunnel construction). The mining bosses must 
then repay this debt once production begins.  
The consequence of this for the miners is that if their team 
leader or pit owner is under pressure to repay a certain debt, they 
experience a dramatic reduction in their pay or they go unpaid. This in 
turn pushed them into further debt as they are unable to repay loans 
made to them while constructing tunnels, and a downward spiral 
ensues. Two additional factors explain the prevalence of this 
phenomenon. Firstly, the miners work outside of formal contractual 
agreements, according to verbal contracts only. These are more easily 
broken, becoming a game of one man’s word against another in the 
occasions the case reaches a hearing with the local or traditional courts.  
Secondly and related to this, recourse to justice appears beyond 
the reach of miners. Not one single case of wage underpayment, wage 
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non-payment, wage theft or mineral theft experienced by a miner raised 
in the case studies had been brought to justice. In instances where 
miners had decided to take the issue to the authorities, the case was 
always reported as ‘under consideration’, and this often several months 
after the event had occurred. More usually, in attempting to reclaim 
payment or stolen minerals, miners were threatened and refused entry 
into the mines, essentially forcing them to leave the job.  
This final violation, where miners attempting to address an 
injustice are forced out of their job, came up multiple times, and raises 
another interesting revelation from the case studies: the high level of 
collusion between different authorities and powers in suppressing and 
controlling the miners. Often, mining bosses collude with FARDC, 
mining police, national police or government agencies such as 
SAESSCAM. In fact, FARDC, mining police and PNC were frequently 
cited as detaining, threatening and imprisoning miners that mine bosses 
had reported as troublesome and then extorting fines for their release.  
FARDC was associated with 20 percent of recorded case study 
violations, most frequently illegal taxation or beatings and torture, 
constituting severe human rights violations. Instances of wage and 
mineral theft were also reported among FARDC soldiers. One man 
began mining in 2007 when his parents had no money to pay for his 
school fees, “My parents are poor. My father had cows and goats, but 
due to war, he lost everything.” Yet, when he earned money or had 
minerals, armed groups, including the FARDC, kept stealing what he 
earned: 
 
In the mining sector, there is always the military. Even if 
they are not in the mines, they are in the villages or on 
the roads where they set up roadblocks. There they 
detain us and rob us.59 
 
Other government officials including local, regional and national 
authorities were associated with 17 percent of case study violations. 
More than half of these cases involved illegal taxation or wage and 
mineral theft.  
 
When the authorities come, they take minerals. This is 
hard for us miners. For example, when the Division 
Manager or the Administrator of the Territory arrives, 
all of the materials of the day are taken. The team leader 
tells us that it is for the authorities. When the Provincial 
Minister passes by, the team leader may even confiscate 
the material for the whole week.60 
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 The national police (PNC) were commonly referenced as using 
their power to repress workers: 
 
We live by the grace of God. The little we earn is for 
food and soap for washing clothes. We’ve fallen into 
debt which we pay off by extracting stones containing 
cassiterite. I know that there are times where they arrest 
people because of these debts. Just a month ago, the 
PNC in Katagota arrested a friend because of money he 
owed for drinks.61 
 
And, SAESSCAM and the mining police, agencies created to 
support or protect the rights of miners and others working in the 
industry were commonly cited as a repressive and abusive force. As with 
other empowered groups, they wield their authority largely to extract 
money from the system: 
 
We have a big problem with the mining authorities and 
SAESCAM who demand big taxes and illegal payments. 
The creuseurs in Mukela are not protected. We need 
someone to advocate for us.62 
 
Many mines in the eastern DRC are controlled, wholly or 
partially, by traditional authorities. The popular legitimacy of the power 
of these leaders varies based on location and integration within local 
society. In some cases, traditional authorities are widely respected and 
play key roles in managing disputes within communities. In other areas 
they are viewed with less respect and seen to be largely seeking to 
maximize personal gain.  
So, while some miners benefit from the authority of traditional 
leaders, they are widely seen to work with other empowered figures at 
the expense of workers. As a 39-year-old man with seven children who 
has worked in mining since 2007 explains: 
 
Whenever a labor dispute reviewed by the traditional 
authorities, they always side with the corrupt mine 
bosses. This lack of independence makes it impossible 
to protect our rights when they are violated by the mine 
owners.63 
 
DRC domestic law requires all artisanal miners to organize into 
cooperatives designed to protect workers’ rights and ensure improved 
working conditions. At present, cooperatives seem to range widely in 
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terms of power and responsibilities.  However, to the degree they gain 
authority as the rules become more standardized across the industry 
there is significant concern among miners that they will play a role 
similar to that of other authorities which is to say that they will provide 
minimal assistance while coming up with ways to take money and 
minerals from different players within the system, particularly the least 
empowered.  
Those presenting testimonies suggested that the process is likely 
to operate like other mechanisms, through the cooperation and 
collusion of multiple authorities. One miner describes how he thinks 
traditional leaders are likely to co-opt cooperatives created in the mines 
under their control:  
 
The cooperatives will not succeed here where there are 
traditional leaders. They will simply put their family 
members in the cooperative and will influence what they 
do. And, if you try to prevent this, they will stop you.64 
 
Our research also revealed the abuses, excesses and violence of 
multiple non-state armed groups. These were described as stealing from 
miners and others at mine sites and along different transit routes, both 
near mines and some distance from them. The groups commonly 
threaten miners and occasionally are described as engaging in forced 
labor, torture and other severe human rights violations.  
 
Other difficulties we have come when the Yakutumba 
soldiers arrive to collect money or gold from each miner 
. . . It is common that these gunmen take control of the 
mining sites and force the people to work on their 
behalf. When that happens, the mining bosses, the 
miners and everyone else working in the mines can do 
nothing.65 
 
As described, when non-state armed groups arrive, they commonly take 
what they want and force workers to labor for them. Still, a number of 
people suggested that there is likely collusion between these forces and 
state forces in terms of allowing multiple parties to benefit from mineral 
extraction and to avoid military engagements.  
While this project gathered significant data on the operation of 
non-state armed groups, the case studies and data collected from the 
major mine sites studied involves substantially less of these violations 
than what is commonly documented within the literature. In this sense 
the study provides some insight into the nature of violations and abuses 
at mines that are less controlled by these non-state groups.  
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It is very important to understand that many of these violations 
and abuses suffered by miners occurred with distinct authority groups 
working in tandem, with FARDC and other government officials 
working together or – more interestingly still – traditional leaders and 
government officials colluding to violate or repress worker rights. This 
suggests that, while different authorities have many sources of 
contestation between each other, they realize that they have a shared 
interest in which they occasionally need to support each other: the 
suppression of workers to exact maximum profit from the mines. This 
also suggests that, rather than being considered as competing power 
structures, de facto and de jure legal systems in artisanal mining areas 
should be viewed as separate entities with considerable areas of overlap 
on certain issues. It is revealing and of cause for concern that in none of 
the 133 case studies recorded across several mining sites over an 
eighteen month period and none of the 51 oral histories were there 
instances where a violation associated with one group was brought to 
justice.  
And notwithstanding the limited data set, some initial 
conclusions can be drawn. The mining sites studied appear intricately 
designed to survey, control, discipline, punish and extort from workers, 
with the overall objective of maintaining the status-quo and suppressing 
worker organization and resistance. Consequently, new policies often hit 
them the hardest. All trading houses interviewed for a recent report 
(OECD, 2012) admitted that miners themselves are most likely to 
receive less money for the minerals they extract once traceability 
schemes are rolled out in the Kivus, as trading houses will have to start 
paying a fixed amount per ton of minerals to finance the traceability 
scheme. The impact of the de facto embargo following the introduction 
of Dodd-Frank (Seay, 2012) is perhaps a more well-known and 
recognized case in point.  In summation, if mining interventions in the 
Kivu provinces do not seriously consider and engage with low- and site-
level power structures and dynamics, workers and mining communities 
seem destined at best to continue on their current trajectory or at worst, 
to continue suffering the consequences of new policies and initiatives.  
 
c) Safety problems in the mines  
 
Safety in the mines is a serious concern. Yet, safety problems in 
mines were raised by only 6 percent of the case studies; this is likely due 
to their near complete ubiquity rather than their apparent absence. 
From our own observations visiting the profiled mining sites and going 
into the tunnels, it is clear that working conditions in the mines are 
fraught with danger. Mining tunnels are often poorly constructed, are 
prone to complete collapse (particularly during the rainy season), and go 
far beyond the legal thirty meter depth, as specified by the Mining Code.  
We suspect it is precisely because of the universality of poor and 
dangerous working conditions in the artisanal mining sector that safety 
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issues were so infrequently raised, as for the miners, working in such 
conditions is the daily norm. The danger is so widely understood that 
dangerous and even deadly tunnel collapses and landslides are viewed as 
something to be expected.  
In the case studies, miners described fatalities, such as a 
situation in Nyabibwe when a pit collapse in July 2013 killed a 26-year-
old miner working alone at the time of the collapse who left behind a 
wife and two children, and who received no compensation following his 
death.66 
 
As one miner explained: 
 
I live with death at my side. If the tunnel collapses on 
me, I will die or survive with a serious disability.67 
 
Miners know that the dangers they face threaten their own lives 
and the future of their families. This is seen in the matter-of-fact tone of 
discussions of severe accidents – virtually the only safety issues widely 
discussed – including those that lead to miners’ deaths:  
 
One day, there was big landslide. Many people died in 
that hole. I myself helped recover ten bodies. I already 
had debts and I was suffering from malaria.68 
 
Since I arrived in Kalimbi, I've seen more than five 
accidents that have killed miners. Myself, I was saved by 
my colleagues in an accident that had killed three.69 
 
As a miner who has worked in the industry for over two 
decades and whose eldest son works with him in Nyabibwe, explained: 
 
I know that sometimes there are fatalities here at 
Kalimbi, as there are everywhere in the mines. With this 
work, we are exposed to hazards. I've seen people die in 
the tunnels. Some are buried alive in wells or injured in 
landslides. When miners die, we bring them home if 
they are from near here.  If they are from far away, we 
bury them at the site. In these unfortunate situations, we 
all contribute.70 
 
The story illustrates both the widespread acceptance of the severe 
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danger of mining coupled with a sense of solidarity among miners that 
varies widely depending on the team, the site and other issues. Yet, the 
difficulty of finding family for those killed and the idea they may be 
buried locally by colleagues, far from their families and villages, is itself 
a type of suffering. 
Yet, miners are also aware of safety differences between one site 
and another. They commonly describe strategies to minimize risk such 
as a miner (who had been a soldier from 1996 until he was demobilized 
in 2005, first with the AFDL and then with multiple other groups), 
followed two brothers into artisanal mining in Misisi, later changing 
mines: 
 
I returned to Mukela because in Misisi I saw many 
people die after being buried in landslides.71  
 
Alongside landslides and tunnel collapses, many miners 
complained that they work in mines where tunnels are too deep with 
very little oxygen circulating.72 One miner reported working in mines up 
to one hundred fifty to two hundred meters deep.73  
 
Inside you come up against water and a lack of oxygen. 
A machine is needed to circulate oxygen down there, 
and it often breaks down. Water is also a big problem. 
There was a mine collapse in October. Two miners were 
injured, one of whom was a friend of mine. One miner 
died. The families received no compensation.74 
 
The failure to ensure adequate air flow can lead to fatalities, as was the 
case in March 2013 in Nyabibwe when a machine to help circulate 
oxygen deep down in the tunnels broke down, leading to the death of a 
young miner.75  
If and when miners fall ill or injure themselves as a result of the 
poor working conditions in the mines, they not only receive no 
compensation or pay while they are away from work, but they can also 
be chased off the mine when they try to return. Such was the case for a 
27-year-old miner from Lemera, who suffered from a bad back after 
carrying bags of rock up a steep one hundred and twenty meter hill for a 
whole day without a break for food or water. Unable to work at full 
capacity the following week (or afford or access appropriate healthcare), 
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the miner was chased off the site by his pit boss, and at the time of the 
research had been unable to return to work or secure his unpaid salary.76  
In December 2012, there was a landslide in a cassiterite mine in 
Lemera in which two miners were killed and one seriously injured. “My 
two friends were killed, but I was spared this because I wanted to leave 
the well to fetch cigarettes. But I'm hurt.”77 He was saved by other 
miners who brought him to a hospital, which fortunately relatively close 
to the mine, unlike in most mining locations where adequate healthcare 
in such circumstances is inaccessible. He was unsure how to pay for his 
care and was looking for someone who might assist him and his family, 
as well as the families of those killed. When project staff looked into 
this case, they received a complex set of different discussions of who 
was responsible. Some authorities said that the responsibility lies with 
the mining boss, but that since they were not legally registered as 
artisanal miners as required by the mining code, there is little that can be 
done.  
In one of the oral histories, a 36-year-old mother of five 
children was forced to start working as a porter after her husband was 
seriously injured: 
 
I work in the mines carrying rocks only because my 
husband was injured in December 2012 in Mugerero in 
a landslide that killed two people that were in a tunnel. 
The mine boss gave us nothing for the care or support 
of our family, even as my husband is now disabled. 
Now, I carry sand and stones from the quarry to the 
river which is about three kilometers. I have to climb 
hills with a heavy burden of over 20 kilograms. If I were 
to fall and break my back, that would the end of my 
whole family.78 
 
The failure of the system to provide any support for the many 
thousands of injured and ill miners is a major problem with the industry 
which highlights the extraordinary risk and vulnerability of artisanal 
miners. 
 Only a few miners discussed injuries. Largely, this is because 
injuries in artisanal mining are so common, even when severe, that 
miners expect these to occur and similarly expect little assistance or 
support from any authority. Despite provisions in the mining code that 
require various safety provisions,  miners commonly work with limited 
if any safety equipment. One miner compared his work in the artisanal 
mines to the industrial mines of Banro:  
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What makes me sad are the conditions in which we 
work here. We have no adequate or appropriate clothing 
to enter the tunnels. We see others at places like Banro 
wearing helmets, masks, and overalls. They earn a good 
salary while we work like animals without any 
protection.79 
 
 Where injuries are described by miners they tend to be severe, 
both physically and psychologically. For example, one female miner 
described having a miscarriage while working: 
 
They put the cassiterite load in my bag and told me I 
could carry it on my back because it was 25 kilograms. 
 
After a few steps, my friends came running and told me 
there was blood running down my legs.  
 
I had started to feel pain and had to stop to see.  
 
Some people had come to help me and they weighed the 
package, which, contrary to what they had told me, 
weighed 70 kilograms.  
 
Nobody cared for me.  
 
The owner of those minerals didn’t pay me anything 
because I hadn’t yet washed the ore.  
 
I sold my clothes to get treatment.  
 
After recovering, I went back in the mines.  
 
There was nothing else I could do.80 
 
 While the story alone does not provide proof that it was 
artisanal mining or the overweight bag of cassiterite that led to the 
miscarriage, the story reveals the danger of the work as well as the 
desperation and profound need that drives Congolese to work in 
artisanal mining. 
Poor hygiene in the mines leading to illness and disease is 
another frequent complaint. Miners commonly fall ill and have limited 
access to health care and no means of offsetting lost wages when they 
are injured or sick. In fact, many mine bosses punish them for an 
absence from work, including refusing to allow them to come back, 
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regardless of the reason. Even basic facilities, like toilets, are absent in 
the mines which creates many health hazards, especially in the larger 
mines.81 In addition, gold mining involves the use of toxic chemicals 
and miners and washers commonly report falling severely ill (being 
“poisoned”) and finding themselves with no safety net and no 
assistance:    
 
We were cleaning the rocks to get out the gold. We 
often got sick but we had no way to get help. In 
Shabunda I dug for gold for three months. But, I was 
poisoned. So, I decided to go Nzibira.82 
  
 What is interesting about the danger of artisanal mining is that it 
is so common as to be understood as expected, with miners doing what 
they can to minimize risks, while well aware of their vulnerability. While 
much of the international attention paid to artisanal mining focuses on 
severe human rights violations largely committed by the FARDC and 
various non-state armed groups, the daily risks of miners are 
enormously serious. 
 
d) Threats and acts of violence 
 
Threats, often backed up by various types of violence, made by 
virtually every empowered actor against miners and others, are 
ubiquitous in the artisanal mining industry. A significant number of the 
case studies, 16 percent, involve instances of miners or other workers 
being threatened or victims of violence on the job.  
A typical case is that of four miners in Katagota who tried to 
claim their unpaid salary from their boss. As a result, they lost their jobs 
and continue to be threatened by their former boss with arrest should 
they ever try to return.83 Similarly, a 33-year-old miner from Lemera 
worked for two months without being paid, producing cassiterite for his 
boss on a daily basis. When he tried to claim a salary for his work, he 
was chased off the mining site and was never paid.84 
In general, miners and others understand their lives to be 
uncertain and are accustomed to great vulnerability. In fact, they know 
that there is essentially no one to turn to when they are mistreated and 
those with power will begin with threats and often act with violence. 
Mining bosses and others change the terms of agreements and threaten 
and punish miners as they see fit: 
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Once, I suffered from an illness and missed a week’s 
work. The mine boss told the team that I should not 
receive any part of the minerals I had worked on before 
I fell sick. What could I do? The mine boss is 
untouchable. If you dare cross him, he either throws you 
out of the mine or has you beaten. There is nothing you 
can do legally.85 
 
Artisanal mines are often so poorly controlled by a singular 
authority that multiple players threaten workers and others and use 
violence to achieve their ends. These include criminal elements at every 
level, from small-scale thieves to well-organized groups. This forces 
miners and others to be constantly vigilant and to spend considerable 
effort, individually and in groups, to seek ways to protect themselves 
and their things: 
 
There are a lot of threats and violence in the mines. 
Whoever’s the strongest intimidates the others.  
There are gangsters, pickpockets, who steal your things 
in the mines.  
It’s like being at the market. There are porters who are 
supposed to help you get your minerals from inside the 
tunnels to the outside, but sometimes they steal your 
work.86 
Threats of acts of violence are particularly likely when miners 
seek to make claims for compensation or to challenge the actions of 
mine bosses and other empowered actors. For example, one 33-year-old 
miner working in Lemera sought to gain compensation for his cousin’s 
family after he was killed in a landslide in a cassiterite mine. He met 
with all of the area authorities, including the traditional leaders: 
 
I spoke with everyone I could to help our family protect 
our rights . . . I was formally notified by the mine 
supervisor, that if I dared return to the mine site I would 
be severely beaten and then sent to prison.87 
 
 Many threats and related violence are associated with the 
structure of the artisanal mining economy, in which miners commonly 
fall into debt as they seek to discover adequate minerals to earn a living. 
Mine bosses often work with state authorities to threaten, imprison, 
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beat and even torture miners when they fall behind on their debts or 
seek to avoid paying them: 
 
It is difficult to tell you how I manage my money. I earn 
next to nothing after I pay off my debts. I can’t avoid 
my creditors who often threaten to take me to the PNC 
and then to jail. So, other than the mine boss himself, 
there are very few working in the mines that save 
anything.88 
 
Instances of underpayment are also common. A 42-year-old 
miner from Lemera was told he would be paid 12,000 FC for 
transporting three 25 kilogram bags of rocks over long distances, but 
received only 4,000 francs. When the miner tried to claim full payment 
for the work, he was threatened by his boss and the police.89 In one 
instance, a miner trying to claim compensation for the death of his 
uncle in a pit collapse in December 2011 was threatened and forced out 
of the mine by the local mwami, or traditional leader.90 
Sometimes threats or violence are accompanied by mineral 
theft, as in the case of two women in Nyabibwe, aged 29 and 34. 
Having bought cassiterite from the mining site, the women were 
attacked by mining security, had their minerals taken off them, and were 
ridiculed and humiliated before being forcefully evicted from the mining 
site.91 There is no law forbidding the participation of women in mineral 
trade, yet the apparent lack of law enforcement in the area allows such 
instances to occur with impunity. 
Overall, miners and others working in the artisanal mining 
industry work in conditions of constant threats and violence or at the 
very least the knowledge that such threats and violence are likely if they 
are to complain to authorities or seek to defend their rights and/or 
claims of mistreatment. The regularity of these threats and the 
significant disempowerment of miners make violence generally 
unnecessary to ensure compliance with authorities’ demands. This 
situation defines the daily lived experience of those laboring in the 
industry. 
 
e) Wage theft and mineral theft 
 
Wage or mineral theft was an extremely common finding, being 
reported by 35 percent of the case studies. This is an interesting finding, 
as while much work has reported the extent to which the artisanal 
mining sector in the eastern DRC adheres to its own norms and order 
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(Geenen, 2011), remuneration for mine workers appears arbitrary and 
unstructured. While they are often indebted to a buyer or a boss who 
has pre-financed pit construction and provides them with materials and 
daily rations, they work outside of formal contracts or salary 
agreements. From the information gathered by the case studies, this 
appears to leave them vulnerable to non-payment, severe 
underpayment, and theft.  
Stories of working for extended periods of time without 
payment were found across all the mining sites studied. In Lemera, a 26-
year-old miner worked for six months without payment.92 In Katagota, 
a 61-year-old man worked for several months as a mine security guard 
without payment.93 In Mukela a 52-year-old miner worked for two 
months with no pay, and so eventually left the job.94 Instances of severe 
underpayment are equally prevalent among the case studies, such as a 
miner who produced nine bags of cassiterite (approximately 270 
kilograms) over a three-month period, for which he received just two 
kilograms worth, or 8,000 Congolese francs, or $9.95 
While mining bosses are responsible for the numerous cases of 
non-payment or severe underpayment, it is state and non-state armed 
groups – as well as, on occasion, government officials and miners 
themselves – who appear to be responsible for the large majority of 
mineral theft cases. For example, two young miners, aged 18 and 22, 
had their minerals stolen in Kagonbe, North-Kivu by the non-state 
armed group Nyatura, in collusion with the mining police.96 Similarly, 
yet seemingly more violent, a 34-year-old miner in Mukungwe was 
stopped on his way home by mine bosses and FARDC soldiers. He was 
searched and then beaten and tortured until he revealed the 23 grams of 
gold he was hiding in his belt. They took nine grams off him, and left 
him with fourteen. A 17-year-old miner working in Kagonbe reported 
having his minerals frequently stolen from him by the Mining Police 
and armed groups.97 Instances of miners stealing from other miners are 
less prevalent than the cases cited above, but do exist. For example, a 
40-year-old miner from Katagota had one day’s worth of minerals 
stolen from him by a colleague.98 
On one occasion, a mining boss from Nzibira found himself 
victim of significant mineral theft, as well as a severe human rights 
violation.99 He had just finished constructing a new tunnel, and was just 
about to start production. A neighboring mining boss, whose own 
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tunnel was flooded and who had an outstanding debt of $250 in urgent 
need of payment, colluded with FARDC to have him arbitrarily arrested 
and imprisoned for a period of four days. During this period, the 
neighboring mining boss and his team worked in the imprisoned man’s 
tunnel to extract his cassiterite. When the man was eventually released, 
he received no compensation or payment for the minerals stolen from 
his tunnel. 
Non-state armed groups commonly steal money, property and 
minerals from miners and others: 
 
In the forest at a place called “black”, the FDLR stole 
everything from us. They shot in the air to intimidate us. 
We were forced to return to Bukavu empty handed.100 
 
They do this systematically at multiple locations, from the many 
roadblocks operated throughout the region to mine sites to paths from 
mines to washing areas and others areas of transport: 
                                                                
One day when we left the mine, we were ambushed by 
the FDLR. There were eight of them and they were well 
armed. 
 
They said, “Hands up!”   
 
There were three of us. We stopped and had to put 
everything down. I had 15 kilograms and the others had 
17 kilograms and 10 kilograms.  
 
The armed men took it all. And one of them said, “You 
can go.” 
 
So, we left. 
 
Another one said, “No.” 
 
We came back and they started to search us. 
 
They were very pleased to find a mobile phone and FC 
20,500. 
 
I had no money and FDLR beat me.101 
 
Money and minerals are also stolen from workers by the refusal 
to pay, significantly reduced payments and systems to undercount and 
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under-weigh actual production. For example, a 40-year-old mother of 
five has spent the past four years working as a twangeuse (one who 
pounds stones to separate the rock form the minerals) and as a porter. 
Her husband farms, but the income is both minimal and seasonal, “we 
have to wait a whole year to sell the harvest.”102 She is commonly 
cheated out of her wages by being paid less than what was promised or 
being forced to carry more weight than she is paid for: 
 
Sometimes I work hard and they don’t pay me . . . There 
are times where the managers make me carry a heavy 
burden of stones. Then, instead of paying me the FC 
2000 we agreed upon, I get 500 FC. And if I complain, I 
might not have a job.103 
 
Another porter with seven children who were once all in school 
describes the financial difficulties of work in the mining industry, 
“Today only four study because life has become difficult and I have no 
money to pay school fees for all seven.”104 He describes the systematic 
nature of wage theft by agreeing on a price and then forcing workers to 
wait for payment and then falsely weighing the bags, leaving workers 
with less than they were supposed to be paid:  
 
They pay us 2500 FC to carry a 50 kg bag of cassiterite. I 
can carry two 50 kg package per day and thus earned FC 
5000. They pay us as soon as we deliver the bag to the 
owner, but sometimes we have to wait two days while 
they are negotiating the payment. The bags are supposed 
to weigh no more than 50 kg for men and 25 kg for 
women. The scales they use are not correct. Traders and 
miners often cheat us about the weight. They give us 75 
kg and say it is 50 kg. So, we are exhausted. Sometimes 
we fall and get hurt because of the weight. But, we 
cannot refuse to carry the bags, even if they weigh more 
than 50 kg because we need the jobs. We are afraid to 
challenge them because they can take the bag and give it 
to another porter.105 
 
Yet, within the mining industry there are moments of kindness and 
generosity. In a way, these are significant because of the enormous 
gratitude of miners and others when they are treated well, allowed to 
earn what was promised or to keep some more of the minerals 
extracted.    
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One young miner describes how he ended up washing cassiterite 
and a day when he was allowed to earn a bit more when a tunnel owner 
allowed him to keep more of his share: 
 
My whole life is full of suffering. I'm fatherless and 
motherless since Kabila’s war in 1996. My father was a 
soldier and he died at the airport when the AFDL took 
Bukavu . . . After the sixth grade, I was unable to 
continue my studies because secondary school is so 
expensive. With all my friends, I went to dig in Walungu 
and Walikale . . . I started cleaning cassiterite. Their 
owners paid me 8,000 FC, but just a meal cost FC 4000. 
I started to fall into debt and soon I was 48000 FC in 
debt. I started to work hard to pay the debt and started 
digging after paying $10 to the crew boss and $15 to the 
owner of the mine. The first day I dug 8 kg of 
cassiterite. I gave 2 kg to the team leader, but the owner 
of the tunnel had mercy on me because I was exhausted 
and had almost nothing. He let me keep the rest and so 
I sold the remaining 6 kg.106 
 
f) Child labor 
 
Nearly a quarter of the case studies, 23 percent, reference child 
labor as defined by Congolese and international law. However, it is 
worth observing that of these thirty cases, 60 percent involved children 
over the age of sixteen and none of the cases referenced children 
younger than fourteen. This does not mean that younger children are 
not working in the mine sites, but rather that those interviewed did not 
focus on this issue. To a large degree, many of those who spoke with 
the research team did not express criticisms of teenage workers laboring 
in the industry. In general, 16 and 17 year olds in the eastern DRC are 
not viewed as children and younger children either crush rocks or 
engage in washing, work commonly done by women and viewed by 
many as far less dangerous.  
In a socio-economic context of widespread poverty and low 
secondary school enrollment and a cultural environment in which 
adulthood begins in early adolescence, it is questionable how to best 
respond to this phenomenon from the Congolese perspective. It is not 
that child labor is not a legal violation, but rather that how it is viewed 
by the community is central to creating a useful response. 
The case studies revealed the importance of children’s labor in 
providing for their families basic needs. The children very often came 
from families living in extreme poverty where they were either the eldest 
household member or had sick or infirm parents or grandparents. For 
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example, three boys aged fourteen to seventeen in Bulau, North-Kivu 
reported that they were working in the mines and specified that they 
were there “of their own free-will” to provide for their family.107 Of 
course, the extent to which free-will can operate in such a context of 
widespread poverty and few viable livelihood opportunities must be 
questioned. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that among the thirty child 
labor cases reported only one was a confirmed case of forced labor in 
which a fourteen year-old boy in Lemera was forced by a woman to 
break rock without being compensated.108 
One miner describes how his younger brother, a child, chose to 
join him working in the mines and why he finds it difficult to counsel 
him to stop this work: 
 
I know that the NGOs told people to remove children 
from the armed forces, but they are still there. A lot of 
kids are back out in the bush because they say that they 
were lied to, that they received nothing of what was 
promised by the NGOs.  My little brother could not pay 
his school fees. So, I sold my radio to help cover these 
costs. But, now I have asked him to come and work to 
provide for his school supplies for next year. They say 
that children should not work in the mines. But, it is 
difficult for me to tell my little brother not to visit the 
mine site since he must work. And, it is useless if people 
from the NGOs try to make us stop.109 
 
An oral history with the vice-president of a mining cooperative 
in Nyabibwe raises the complexity of the issue, by pointing out the 
consequences of banning children from mines: 
 
We’ve observed that now there’s a problem with street 
children who can no longer work in the mines but they 
have nothing else to do so they live in the street…We 
need some social support programs to help them, 
because they no longer have any other work.110 
 
This being said, the study did found multiple cases of fourteen 
and fifteen years old doing dangerous work in the mines, thereby 
confirming the widespread existence of child labor as reported widely 
elsewhere. We suspect that had more research been carried out in 
mining sites in North Kivu and in sites more isolated than those 
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selected for this study, the recorded prevalence of child labor would 
likely have been even higher. 
Alongside the issue of children working are significant 
discrepancies in wages and working conditions for child laborers. For 
example, wage differentiation between children and adults was 
specifically raised in five reported cases of child labor in Katagota 
involving children aged 14 to 17.111 The children reported being paid 
3,000 Congolese francs (a little over three dollars) to crush 20 kilograms 
of stone, whereas the adults are paid 7,000 Congolese francs for the 
same work.  
 
g) Illegal taxation and extortion 
 
There is substantial illegal taxation and extortion within the 
artisanal mining industry. However, it is not always easy to distinguish 
one form of extracting payment from another in terms of how it should 
be described. That is, from the perspective of miners, illegal taxes and 
extortion is the norm not the exception. It is so widely practiced and so 
profoundly integrated into the entire system that it hardly appears as a 
formal complaint in the case studies. 
At times, these payments are presented as a tax or “ration”, 
especially when collected by the FARDC. 
 
The military came to us four times a week for payment. 
Each time, I got to keep about half of the material I 
mined. We always had to pay the mine bosses and the 
military. Still, after seven months, I made $250. I 
decided to return to Bukavu.112 
 
The soldiers would come to receive payments two times 
a week. You had to pay them or they would put you in 
jail.113 
 
At times an agreed upon payment to the mine boss is 
exacerbated by an illegal tax from the FARDC, PNC, mine police or 
others. In this case, a miner who had previously had bad luck finally 
found some cassiterite and ended up with only a fifth of what he 
extracted:  
 
At the tunnel exit, the team chief was waiting. When I 
presented the 10 kg, he took 6 kg and left me with 4 kg.  
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A few meters from there, I met soldiers who threatened 
me and force me to give them 2 kg. So, that left me with 
2 kg of cassiterite.114 
 
A notable case was of five porters, aged between 32 and 55, in 
Nyange.115 These men carry heavy sacks of rock from the mine to the 
town for nine hours each day. In return, they receive a payment of 2,000 
Congolese francs, or a little over two dollars. However, each of the five 
men reported that at various points FARDC, non-state armed groups 
and the mining police all set up their own roadblocks and extracted 
illegal taxes from the little money that they make.  
In addition, arbitrary arrest and threatened arbitrary arrest are 
associated with extortion. For example, in one case, a 28 year-old man 
in Nyabibwe was arbitrarily arrested by the PNC, had his goods stolen, 
and was then imprisoned for two days. To secure his release, he was 
forced to pay the significant sum of 74,000 Congolese francs, or $82.116 
In another case, a miner from Nzibira was threatened with arrest by 
FARDC soldiers and the Mining Police, and was forced to pay $100 to 
avoid imprisonment. These amounts are very significant for artisanal 
miners. It is likely that the amounts of illegal taxes and extortion (it is 
often difficult to distinguish between the two, especially given the ever-
present use and/or threat of violence by authorities) vary widely by site, 
particular authority, individual case and other factors. While this 
situation merits further study, it highlights the overall determination by 
this research project that the particular practices within the artisanal 
mining industry vary by site are commonly flexible and constantly 
shifting. 
An example of what happens when a miner refuses the tradition 
of working for FARDC – known as salongo – was raised by the case of 
31-year-old miner from Nzibira.117 Each day, the miners at Nzibira are 
expected to pay a daily ‘ration’ of their work to the military. Refusing to 
pay his ration, the miner was banned from entering the mine until he 
agreed to work for one whole week on behalf of the military. Believing 
the Commander to be in Bukavu on his weekly security meeting, the 
miner went into the mine nonetheless. He was however spotted by the 
Commander who had stayed in Nzibira, was arrested, thrown in prison, 
and severely beaten.  
One final example of a 29-year-old woman who washes 
minerals in Nzibira highlights the discriminatory gender dynamics that 
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occur at mining sites.118 To access and wash abandoned rock around the 
mines to look for and sell any leftover cassiterite, this woman was told 
by the pit boss that she would have to sleep with him. When she started 
working, the pit boss then imposed a tax on the small quantities of 
cassiterite that she managed to find. The woman reported that the local 
authorities also impose a special tax on all women working in the 
mining site, simply because they are women. Women who refuse to pay 
this tax are summoned in front of the traditional authorities and 
sometimes even the military.  
 
h) Severe human rights violations 
 
This study reveals the systematic nature of underpayment, non-
payment, cheating, excessive taxes, threats and the constant abuse of the 
powerless by the powerful (relatively speaking).  Yet, the case studies 
and oral histories also documented multiple severe human rights 
violations. Approximately 13 percent of case studies reference severe 
human rights violations, underlining the volatile and dangerous climate 
in which miners work. Many of these cases involved miners being 
illegally imprisoned and/or severely beaten, predominantly by FARDC 
soldiers.  
Beatings, sometime quite severe, appear commonplace. For 
example, a fifty-year-old miner who was beaten by FARDC soldiers for 
refusing to help construct a road block.119 And, in another case, a thirty-
year-old miner who was severely beaten for not paying his military 
‘rations’.120  However, because of this, physical abuse is often not 
practiced by empowered forces that can commonly achieve their ends 
because of the widespread understanding of the possibility or even 
likelihood that a threat of violence will be followed by actual violence. 
One 26-year-old miner from Mukungwe was imprisoned and 
tortured by FARDC after his mining boss reported him for being 
suspected of working for Banro.121 Another slightly more complex 
example involved a level of collusion between two miners and some 
FARDC soldiers in Nyabibwe to illegally mine a closed pit one night.122 
When morning came, the miners stayed back in the tunnel, hoping that 
the soldiers would get bored and go away, leaving them to keep the 
cassiterite to themselves. However, the soldiers simply became 
impatient and gathered grass and wood to fill the tunnel entrance, and 
then set the entrance on fire. Rather than suffocate from the fumes, the 
miners came out of the tunnel. One of them escaped, while the other 
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was thrown in jail for five days and made to pay a $45 fine for his 
release. 
Non-state armed groups were also described as brutal and cruel 
in their actions. Not only did they steal from miners, but they beat 
them, tortured them and even killed them: 
 
And, I can’t count the number of times I fell into the 
hands of the FDLR. My whole body is covered in scars 
because of how they beat me nearly to death and robbed 
me of all my possessions.  
 
One day my friends fell into their trap and were severely 
tortured. To break them, they put a can in the fire and 
used it to burn their bodies. They made them give them 
all the money they had.123 
 
These experiences were not dominant in the mine sites studied, but they 
are clearly a core element of artisanal mining in the region and it is these 
abuses and efforts to end them that have been the focus of the many 
efforts to end the trade in conflict minerals in the DRC. 
Despite the seriousness and systematic nature of human rights 
violations in the artisanal mining industry in the region, the research did 
not reveal that miners live in conditions of unremitting suffering. For 
example, while some international NGOs have documented mines with 
over 90 percent rates of slavery, this is quite different from what our 
work revealed.124 In fact, this project found forced labor to be common, 
yet structured in a manner that allowed miners to continue to remain in 
the industry. That is, like illegal taxation, extortion and beatings, the use 
of forced labor was largely temporary such that it extracted value from 
miners and others while allowing them to continue to earn enough to 
remain at the mines.  
The study found forced labor of various types to be common, 
yet generally limited to a set number of days. Often, it was used as a 
proxy for illegal taxes or as a mode of punishment: 
 
Very often, mining is impacted by the military. If a 
miner has not paid the famous “ration”, the military will 
come and beat him and steal everything he owns. And 
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124 Free the Slaves, an international research and advocacy group 
conducted a field project in three mine sites where they found that 866 
individuals out of 931 interviewed by researchers “were confirmed to be 
in various forms of slavery in three mining communities.” (FTS 2013) 
To the degree that the research reveals a useful representative sample of 
these communities, the work suggests that over 9 out of every 10 
miners is enslaved. 
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there are arbitrary arrests. Once arrested, the military or 
the police force us to work for one or two days for 
them.125 
 
Nevertheless, we also found cases in which forced labor lasted 
for longer periods of time and was associated with extended periods of 
violation as this miner describes:  
 
We were forced to give the soldiers contributions of 
$1.50 per week. If you refused, they would throw you in 
jail. To get out of prison, the soldiers made you sign a 
contract where you agree to work for them for two 
months and give them everything. I fell into their trap 
twice and I worked for them as a forced laborer.126 
 
Yet, this case is interesting in that these extended periods of forced 
labor are referenced as a “trap” whose repressive quality is the 
exception rather than the rule in the life of this miner. 
In fact, one of the characteristic elements of the artisanal mining 
that we documented in the six sites studied was the idea of miners’ 
freedom of movement. We found that miners were able to move easily 
from one place to another and that they commonly left one mining site 
for another, often with the idea (sometimes true) that they would find 
better luck elsewhere: 
  
A miner is like a free woman. When he thinks 
something’s not going well, he goes somewhere else. 
When you have a ‘digger’s card’ you’re authorized to dig, 
you can go and dig anywhere in the country. You can go 
to Shabunda, you show your card, and they let you do 
your work.127 
 
This experience probably ranges widely depending on the location 
studied and is less likely to be true in sites that are directly controlled by 
armed groups. Nevertheless, one of the main conclusions of our 
research is that by listening to miners and others one understands them 
as disempowered low wage laborers working within a complexly 
informal system that offers the possibility of improved earnings within a 
context of uncertainty and danger. In this sense, there is a broad 
commonality of experience as regards safety violations, wage theft, 
mineral theft, illegal taxes, extortion and threats, yet wide variety of 
experience among miners in terms of forced labor and especially severe 
human rights violations, such as torture, rape and killing. This 
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distinction helps explain how artisanal mining operates as an industry 
and has broad implications for seeking to reform practices and develop 
more protective mechanisms for improving the mining conditions and 
respect for miners’ rights. 
 
i) Other issues 
 
 The project identified a range of other issues of relevance to 
understanding the lived experience of miners, porters, washers and 
others. 
 There is widespread mistreatment of women in the artisanal 
mining industry. Often women are pressured to have sex with mine 
bosses and other authorities. While it is difficult to determine the 
severity of the coercion, the pressures are constant and, at times, clearly 
intense. 
One 26-year-old woman living in Nzibira described how she 
was attracted to the mines, “My family was very poor . . . As a teenager, 
I wanted to be like my friends but it was impossible because of our 
situation.”128 She described how terribly she felt when she was a 
teenager and couldn’t buy clothes or cosmetics like her friends, “I was 
miserable and my friends started to make fun of me.”129 With no 
resources, connections or profession, she couldn’t get a decent job, “I 
saw other girls working in the mines and they had a little money to solve 
their problems.” 130  
So, she went to the mines and worked carrying bags of 
cassiterite and washing them to separate the minerals from the rock. 
Yet, in the mines she found significant sexual violence and pressure: 
 
The men here look at all the women in the mines as 
objects of pleasure. Several mine bosses, and even 
miners, wanted me to be “their woman”, their sex 
partner, in exchange for giving me minerals to carry and 
wash . . . I was afraid of being raped. In this work, 
everything happens and the men –diggers, mine bosses, 
soldiers – violate women without any consequences. 
Several of my friends were already victims.131 
 
Because of these dangers, she left the mines, “I decided to leave this job 
forever.”132 
 Female workers’ status as women presents a key vulnerability 
that is exploited by those in power. They face special dangers and risks 
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and, given the absence of recourse to justice in the mines, where abuses 
occur, there are limited formal means of filing complaints and, by all 
accounts, complete impunity. 
Alongside these abuses, there are also other types of 
discrimination against women, including ideas that are rooted in key 
beliefs about gender differences. For example, there are widely held 
beliefs that if women enter the mines, especially tunnels, they will 
impact the success of mining operations, Women do not have 
permission to enter the mine because they say that if they did, the mine 
would become barren.”133 A number of people mentioned this issue, 
which suggests that cultural concepts of gender impact many aspects of 
the artisanal mining industry.  
 The conditions of the mines make a decent livelihood difficult, 
not only in terms of wages, but also because the environment is 
dangerous and uncertain. For example, when miners earn money they 
have great difficulty saving it safely or transmitting money safely to their 
families. One miner who now has seven children left school and started 
looking for work. He worked in a tea plantation and then a cinchona 
farm and then as a tailor. “I found that none of these jobs were 
profitable, so I started working in the mines.” 134 While he found that he 
earned better wages, he faced constant violence and the difficulty of 
protecting the wages he earned:  
 
In Nzibira, there is no way to save money. There is no 
bank or cooperative. When I sell minerals, I keep my 
money on me or buy something. But I am always afraid 
because there is no security. The FARDC fight with the 
Raia Mutomboki. When this happens, all work stops and 
we hide in the bush until the fighting ends. And, 
everything you may have bought, like goats, will be 
stolen.135 
 
Another miner echoes this problem: 
 
We don’t save money because here there are no banks.  
 
We all want to save money, but we can’t do this. Yet, 
one can take out a cooperative savings and credit in 
Nzibira and we can become members. Oh yes. 
 
The money we earn, we spend the same day.  
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We do this because we’re afraid that someone will rob 
us or steal the money. Before, it was calm. It was 
peaceful. Everyone kept his money in his pocket 
without fear that anyone would steal or rob. 
 
If one is trying to get money for savings in Bukavu, 
others are plotting against you. Miners, bandits or 
soldiers come to rob you. It’s easy to move gold to 
Bukavu, but cassiterite is very difficult, because it weighs 
too much.136 
 
In general, there is a pressing need for miners to gain access to safe 
mechanisms to save money that they earn and/or to transmit these 
earnings to family members living away from the mine sites. By being 
forced to keep whatever they save as cash within the dangerous 
environment of mining sites, they are often targeted by criminals. This 
makes saving money difficult and encourages miners to spend what they 
earn in the bars, restaurants and brothels that surround mining sites. 
This is interesting, as it goes against many research findings that criticize 
miners for their profligacy with what they earn. In fact, the research 
conducted here suggests that miners would prefer to save money and 
send remittances back to family then waste it on site, if they had the 
possibility to do so. 
 While the predatory nature of those in the mining communities 
has been reported in many reports, it is also important to recognize that 
there are few diversions in and around the mines, so it is not difficult to 
understand why miners spend their money at bars and on other 
entertainment: 
 
In our mine site, we always work as a team. This helps a 
lot, especially if there is a good production. After we 
divide up what we find, we can make $70 each for the 
week. However, we have no way to save our money. So, 
I want to bring my family something. But, also I want to 
relax here with my friends In Mukela, beer costs from 
1,500 Fc to 2,300 Fc. And, I need at least five bottles.137 
 
One interesting finding from our research is the number of 
miners in their 40s, 50s and even 60s. Given the difficult nature of the 
labor, it is likely that this group is more prone to injuries and may also 
face multiple additional risks. That said, these miners did not complain 
about special risks posed by their age. This is likely related to the fact 
that people in the region expect to continue to engage in difficult 
physical labor as long as they are able. Alongside a focus on children in 
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the mines, there may also be a protective benefit to consider the special 
needs of older miners. 
Along these lines it is interesting how many miners were 
interested in learning more about their rights: 
 
Although I married my wife by working in the mines, I 
have to admit that there are many problems and 
excesses in mining. One problem is that we don’t know 
the law.  Miners need awareness and training about 
human rights and mining laws.138 
 
One key issue here is to develop mechanisms to protect the legal rights 
of miners and others and to create systems that encourage fair earning 
and the ability to save money and provide for their families. However, 
also important are efforts to enable the dignity of miners within an 
industry that is, by its nature, difficult and stressful.  
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Artisanal mining in the eastern DRC is widely understood to be 
both a complex and problematic sector and a core element of the 
region’s seemingly intractable problems. However, unlike many 
situations around the world where economic production is bound to 
significant social and political problems, artisanal mining in the country 
has been the subject of considerable and often impressive research as 
well as multiple domestic and international policy activities. 
As regards research, reports and studies, artisanal mining in the 
region has been reviewed extensively by domestic NGOs, international 
NGOs, inter-governmental agencies, foreign governments and various 
the United Nations’ bodies. This study references some, but by no 
means all, of this significant literature. The substantial body of research 
on mining provides considerable detail on human rights and labor rights 
violations in and around the mines. It also reviews the complex and 
intricate links between artisanal mining and the ingoing conflict, often 
showing how multiple armed groups benefit economically and, by 
extension, politically from their control of mines and mineral transport, 
sale and smuggling.  In addition, as discussed in section three above, the 
DRC government, various foreign governments (such as the U.S., 
European Union states and OECD states) as well as the U.N. and 
regional organizations (such as ICGLR) have developed various policies 
to address the issue of conflict minerals and other key problems within 
the country’s artisanal mining industry. Some of these policies have 
been implemented and others are in their early stages.  
Overall, what is clear is that many domestic and international 
actors have taken an interest in artisanal mining in the DRC, especially 
in the eastern region of the country. With this in mind, any effort to 
propose recommendations and/or policy approaches require an 
acknowledgment of what has already been proposed (even with the 
understanding that a full review of past recommendations is not 
possible here). The energy and resources devoted to policy responses to 
artisanal mining issues is so significant that it is important to temper any 
new suggestions with the understanding that many experts have already 
been deeply engaged with the issue. This highlights the complexity of 
the challenge and situates this report within a large body of important 
prior work. 
With this in mind, this study does not pretend to provide a new 
vision of the artisanal mining industry of the eastern DRC. Rather, its 
contributions are meant to be complementary to multiple past, current 
and future research and policy initiatives and, as such, are presented 
divided between four types of recommendations: approaches to policy 
making, these are general suggestions for how to frame policy 
discussions; research and policy analysis, including specific calls for new 
initiatives that build on existing work; direct assistance to miners and 
others working in the industry, suggesting a number of miners’ specific 
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needs; and, governance and regulation of artisanal mining, outlining 
possible responses the pressing issue of the legal management of the 
industry. 
 
a. Approaches to policy making 
 
Engage and address the actual political economy of artisanal 
mining – This study’s focus on oral histories and case studies 
highlights the importance of recognizing that artisanal mining in 
the eastern DRC operates within a complex political economy 
that involves multiple state and non-state actors. That is, for all 
its well-documented dysfunction and illegality, artisanal mining 
is a large industry that manages to extract, process, and export 
millions of dollars in core minerals. And, within this system 
there are core players – mine bosses, crew bosses, traders, 
traditional leaders, non-state armed groups, state security forces 
and others – each of whom benefit in different ways from the 
industry as it currently operates. For this reason, any artisanal 
mining policy or initiative that does not duly consider the 
localized space of the Congolese political economy139 is likely to 
fall short of its desired outcome or, worse still, further entrench 
the power and control of groups it was looking to weaken at the 
expense of those it was hoping to empower. For example, the 
recent top-down mandate of establishing mining cooperatives to 
support and protect all artisanal miners appears in many cases to 
have had the reverse effect, strengthening traditional chiefs and 
local businessmen while exerting another layer of control, 
harassment and even extortion over workers. Often, a focus on 
the industry’s systematic problems and its reliance on 
institutionalized human rights violations encourages a 
perspective that fails to engage the multiple motivations, 
incentives and benefits that enable artisanal mining to function. 
Appropriate and realistic policy making, then, should integrate a 
careful, context-sensitive review of the actual political economy 
of artisanal mining and develop policies that play off of existing 
actors’ incentives. While this careful process of balancing 
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worker protections and existing power structures will not be 
easy, it is necessary for developing effective policies. 
 
Recognize the diversity within different mines and regions – 
While the overall artisanal mining industry is characterized by 
widespread labor and human rights violations, there exist 
significant variation among mine sites as regards particular 
practices. The level of competition and/or collusion between 
state and non-state actors is, in fact, highly localized, 
demonstrating significant variance from one mining site to 
another. This can be seen, for example, in the area of mine 
security. In one mining site, the presence of state forces – 
FARDC, the mining police, the PNC – may be viewed as largely 
positive (even as they illegally tax miners and others). Yet, in 
another site, they may be viewed as fundamentally predatory. 
Interestingly, by listening to the stories of workers, perceptions 
of legitimacy, fairness and functionality vary widely by location. 
This suggests that it is not the institution per se – the FARDC, 
cooperatives, or traditional leaders – that determine higher levels 
of order and legitimacy within mines, but how they operate in 
specific places. This makes it difficult to provide blanket 
recommendations and requires an appreciation on the behalf of 
policy-makers and practitioners working on artisanal mining in 
the eastern DRC of the importance of local context. What may 
work well in one particular place and time may work less well, or 
indeed, be unnecessary or counterproductive, in another.  
 
Accept and embrace artisanal mining as a legitimate livelihood 
strategy and significant element of the local and national 
economy – Artisanal mining is one of the major industries in 
North and South Kivu and miners and others generally choose 
to work in the industry because they view the work as the a 
reasonable activity within the universe of available options. 
Because some miners experience devastating acts of violence 
and brutal repression and as a result of the industry’s link to 
ongoing conflict, many reports and projects envision artisanal 
mining as a form of labor that is almost entirely negative. Yet, 
hundreds of thousands of Congolese work in and around the 
mines and countless more rely on mine earnings. By focusing on 
violations with a failure to engage the legitimacy of mining as a 
livelihood strategy, these efforts often do a disservice to 
potential reforms. Instead, a more productive policy vision 
would openly engage the very real abuses that characterize the 
industry, while accepting and even embracing the fact that 
artisanal mining is an important and productive activity for 
miners and others as well as a key part of the local, national and 
regional economy. If anything, policies should seek to increase 
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the economic benefits for miners who wish to remain in the 
industry while encouraging greater local development benefits in 
mining communities and in the general regions where mining is 
dominant. 
 
Avoid understanding the solutions to problems in the artisanal 
mining industry as solely related to brutal actions of armed 
groups – The term “conflict minerals” has come to dominate 
reviews of artisanal mining in the eastern DRC. This is positive 
in that it highlights the success of years of advocacy efforts to 
draw much-needed attention to the link between the conflict 
and mineral wealth. However, this focus runs the risk of 
suggesting that the very real suffering of Congolese workers and 
others in the industry are wholly a function of abuses by state 
and non-state armed groups. While many key aspects of the 
structural problems of the artisanal mining industry cannot be 
fully resolved as long as the conflict continues, the larger issue 
of workers’ rights and the often repressive nature of artisanal 
mining is a serious issue that is likely to continue even where the 
conflict has ended. For example, many of the mine sites in this 
study are in areas where the state exerts complete or near-
complete control and yet workers recount many violations 
which are similar to those in mines in less secure areas. The 
point is that only some of the core problems and rights 
violations in the artisanal mining industry can be understood 
and addressed through the conflict minerals framework. 
 
Link policy vision with commitments to improved infrastructure 
– The infrastructure challenges in North Kivu and South Kivu 
are extraordinary. Outside of Bukavu and Goma, roads are 
generally in terrible condition such that short trips can take 
many hours, especially in the rainy season. Mines located in 
more distant, rural areas, are often only accessible through dirt 
paths connected to small landing strips services by planes. The 
resulting costs and levels of inefficiency are extraordinary and 
represent a key element of the problematic structure for 
artisanal mining. While improving infrastructure in the region is 
an enormous and costly challenge, this is an issue that should be 
raised in all policy discussions. The exceedingly low levels of 
infrastructure improvement are particularly striking given the 
multi-billion dollar investment of the international community 
in the region.  
 
Avoid an overly simple understanding of the protective value of 
existing laws and state institutions – Artisanal mining in the 
eastern DRC supports multiple players within the region that 
operate outside of a clear engagement with existing regulations 
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and state institutions. It is not that state agencies and laws are 
irrelevant, but rather that the industry operates in a manner the 
enables, if not encourages, practices that ignore laws even where 
these practices represent serious human rights and labor rights 
violations. For this reason, addressing these substantial harms 
and violations endemic to artisanal mining is not served by a 
simple claim that laws should be enforced and state agencies 
should do their jobs. In fact, within the DRC there are multiple 
overlapping laws and regulations and distinctions between stated 
and real agency powers that lead many in the industry, 
particularly workers, to view law as a barrier to safer work 
environments, improved conditions and greater protections. 
Reference to laws and regulations and efforts to coordinate 
existing legislation and develop new rules should all be managed 
with a direct analysis of what actually works on the ground. 
Consequently, new policies or initiatives that fail to incorporate 
an understanding of this reality end up harming workers. For 
example, a recent report found that all trading houses surveyed 
admitted that miners themselves are most likely to receive less 
money for the minerals they extract once traceability schemes 
are rolled out in the Kivus, as trading houses will have to start 
paying a fixed amount per ton of minerals to finance the 
traceability scheme. (OECD, 2012) The same is true for other 
rules and regulations. Above all, increased state control with 
reference to multiple existing laws is unlikely to ensure 
substantive protections for those laboring in and around the 
mines. 
 
Artisanal mining is structured in a manner that generally 
disempowers miners and other workers and commonly relies on 
systematic repression and violence – Our research reveals that, 
regardless of the presence or absence of non-state armed 
groups, the artisanal mining industry systematically disciplines 
miners in a manner that enables empowered actors to extract 
wealth while generally suppressing worker organization. For this 
reason the inherently repressive and ill-regulated nature of the 
industry cannot be fully understood through a legal analysis of 
rights, whether grounded in the broader protective vision of 
human rights or as bound to the specifics of mining related laws 
and regulations. Instead, what is required is an improved 
understanding of how to maximize worker empowerment and 
control within a system whose strength is often its flexibility and 
responsiveness to shifts in market demands.  This requires a 
baseline of security coupled with mechanisms that create 
incentives for a safer are more protective workplace coupled 
with systems that increase workers’ earnings, protect their 
savings and heighten their control over their lives. 
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Integrate miners and others in policy – One benefit of a 
research project that focuses on the lived experience of miners 
and others working in the artisanal mining industry is that it 
highlights how ordinary Congolese respond to the daily 
challenges of working in the artisanal mining industry. In case 
after case, miners direct their sensitivity and intelligence towards 
navigating work in a difficult and dangerous industry that offers 
some key advantages alongside significant brutality and abuse. 
Despite their poverty and vulnerability, miners and others use 
the tools they have to minimize their risks and maximize their 
benefits and, where they are successful, these lessons may be 
integrated more broadly within the industry. 
 
b. Research and policy analysis 
 
Create a multi-sectorial mapping exercise of artisanal mining in 
the eastern DRC – One means of empowering artisanal miners 
and other workers at the bottom of the supply chain could start 
by conducting a full mapping of all actors involved in the 
industry. An excellent list of national and provincial actors is 
available in perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of 
artisanal mining in the DRC to date, produced by Pact in 2010 
and referenced in the bibliography to this report. Yet, what 
might be valuable today would be a mapping of all artisanal 
mining actors and networks, connecting state agencies, NGOs, 
and private interests such as traders. This might provide 
assistance in gauging the relative effectiveness of policy 
interventions. Once this mapping exercise has been done, likely 
responses of each actor to the proposed intervention can be 
anticipated, risks identified and mitigated, and opportunities 
revealed and exploited. If the potential risks out-weigh the 
benefits, the intervention should be redesigned or abandoned 
for another, more appropriate course of action.   
 
Engage in coordinated review of multiple policies to address 
conflict minerals – Over the past several years, the DRC 
government, the international community, various governments 
and multiple domestic and international NGOs have created a 
series of different systems and initiatives to address the issue of 
conflict minerals in the country. These mechanisms vary in 
terms of their legal status and regulatory demand and tend to be 
based on the concepts of due diligence, certification, and 
traceability. These include the DRC government’s work with 
MONUSCO on “centres de négoce”, elements of the U.S. 
Dodd-Frank Act, the industry-led ITRI Tin Supply Chain 
initiative, the German government’s Federal Bureau of Geo-
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Sciences and Natural Resources (BGR) mineral tracing system, 
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s 
(ICGLR) Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) data 
collection,  and promotion of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the OECD’s “Due 
Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas”. While the 
ICGLR initiatives highlight compatibility with other 
mechanisms (such as the ITRI/iTSCI, BGR/CTC and OECD 
guidelines), there is a pressing need for clarity and coordination 
among these systems. At present, virtually all actors within the 
DRC artisanal mining industry are unclear as to the full scope of 
these systems and the ways in which they will impact mining 
and the lives of miners. To some degree, this lack of clarity is a 
function of the evolving nature of the policies. Nevertheless, a 
system of integration and coordinated review and 
communication would be of great value for improving the 
industry and better protecting the fundamental rights of workers 
and others. 
 
Need for more field based data on the industry – In general, 
there is a need for more accurate, field-based data on artisanal 
mining. One reason that it is difficult to make clear claims about 
what is going on in the industry and which policies have a 
positive impact is that there is a lack of rigorous data collection. 
IPIS is involved in a very useful region-wide review of mine 
locations and mine conditions. This is an excellent first step 
which could be supplemented with formal multi-site surveys, 
clear data collection on mine payments, improved information 
about mining injuries and deaths, improved mineral pricing data 
and case study reviews of mine sites. 
 
c. Direct assistance to miners and others working in artisanal 
mining 
 
Increase workers’ ability to manage their money and control 
finances – While artisanal miners are relatively low wage manual 
laborers, many earn more money in the industry than they do 
pursuing other opportunities. This is true despite the inherent 
uncertainties of the industry and the fact that mine workers earn 
money in relation to the value of what they extract (or wash, 
carry, etc.) Yet, when miners earn money our research revealed 
that they have few if any mechanisms to safely store or save 
their earnings. This significantly impacts their ability to use 
mining as a means for improving their finances and the well-
being of their families. As such, workers would benefit from 
systems of effective savings and sending funds to their families. 
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In addition, these efforts could be linked with non-profit 
systems of small loans, miners’ credit unions, as well as training 
in managing earnings and planning to address the uncertainties 
of the industry. 
 
Train workers in fundamental rights – The oral history and case 
study research as well as other aspects of the 
Kazisafi/RITEWORK project demonstrate that miners and 
others are eager to learn more about labor rights and human 
rights. This is true even where they understand the limitations of 
effectively advocating for their rights and where they understand 
that formal domestic and international law protections are 
partially and inadequately implemented at mine sites. There 
should be expanded rights training, capacity building and 
education for miners and others involved in artisanal mining 
covering DRC laws, international norms, and related issues. 
 
Increase access to protective equipment and safety training – 
Artisanal mining in the eastern DRC is extremely dangerous and 
serious injuries are so common that miners view these as an 
inherent element of participation in the industry. There is no 
widely available data on injuries in the industry, exceedingly 
limited health care for injured miners, and no compensation 
mechanisms for miners injured or killed. Our research revealed 
a general lack of access to even basic safety equipment, such as 
boots and protective headgear. While there is no simple way to 
improve the safety of the artisanal mining industry, the 
seriousness of the problem merits a focused, practical response. 
There is a pressing need for financial mechanisms to offset 
injuries and death. In addition, incentives should be 
implemented so that mine bosses and crew bosses heighten 
safety protections and so that workers can receive much-needed 
care when they are injured. It may also be useful to provide 
mine safety training as regards tunnel construction and 
management, basic first aid and related issues.  
 
Provide literacy and related training to miners – Miners would 
benefit from literacy training and other assistance to empower 
them to protect their own rights. Whatever vulnerabilities 
miners and other mine workers possess, such as illiteracy and 
difficulties tracking costs and charges, are used by mine bosses 
and others as a tool for repressive actions. This type of 
education could be integrated within other service programs and 
may have, over the long run, a significant positive impact as 
regards worker empowerment. 
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Explore mobile phone technology – Mobile phone technology 
may provide a number of efficient means to help protect miners 
and others working in the industry. Mobile applications may be 
useful for safely sending remittances back to families or for 
communicating real time information mine security and mineral 
prices. While not all mine sites have cell phone service, mobile 
phones may turn out to be a valuable tool for protecting miners’ 
rights. 
 
Provide livelihood diversification support – While mining is a 
productive means of earning a living for many Congolese, the 
quality of mining as a livelihood option and the general 
protection of workers’ rights will be improved by expanding 
economic opportunities for miners and others living in and 
around mine sites. Many miners are interested in learning skills 
through which they can leave artisanal mining. Others would 
benefit from added income on off-seasons, particularly as 
regards agricultural production. In addition, mining is an 
industry commonly impacted by global market shifts as well as 
changing regulations and policy initiatives. Skills training, 
capacity building, micro-lending and other programs in mine 
producing areas are likely to improve the overall labor market. 
Certainly the Kazisafi/RITEWORK alternative livelihoods 
initiative displayed the value of such training and its usefulness 
for improving individual opportunities and area development. 
 
d. Governance and regulation of artisanal mining. 
 
Review current DRC mining rules and institutions – At present, 
there are multiple DRC government agencies responsible for the 
management of the artisanal mining sector. These include the 
Congolese Ministry of Mines which has overall responsibility, as 
well as the Provincial Authority of Mines; the Mining Registry 
(CAMI); the Geology Directorate; the Technical Unit for 
Coordination and Planning of Mining (CTCPM); the Service for 
Assistance and Organization of Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining (SAESSCAM) and; the Centre for Evaluation, Expertise, 
and Certification (CEEC). And these and other government 
bodies are supposed to manage institutional regulations, various 
presidential and executive branch directives, the 2002 Mining 
Code and the 2003 Mining Regulations. Often, there is 
unnecessary duplication and overlapping of roles between these 
distinct agencies. For example, multiple agencies are required for 
an Artisanal Exploitation Zone (AEZ) to be opened and the 
getting a required “carte d’exploitant artisanal” or miner’s card is 
a lengthy and bureaucratic process. The complexity of these 
institutions and their associated rules should be carefully 
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reviewed and simplified. While this is a significant shift for DRC 
governance, such changes will be useful for making the system 
functional. Some possible reforms include: supporting CAMI to 
establish officially recognized AEZs throughout North Kivu 
and South Kivu, and disperse this information in relevant 
mining communities; decentralizing the process of acquiring 
miner’s cards; supporting cooperatives where they appear to 
represent workers, and working to create locally relevant 
associations in areas where they do not; and a total reform of 
SAESSCAM, or possibly closing it down. 
 
Improve rights protections in artisanal mining – Artisanal 
mining in the eastern DRC is defined by systematic labor rights 
and human rights violations. While there is no singular means to 
address these violations, focused efforts should be directed 
towards several key issues including ending forced labor, ending 
the wide reliance on child labor and reducing the dangers and 
inequity faced by women. In many cases, there is progress in 
these areas as many miners expressed an understanding of basic 
rights questions and restrictions, for example, on child labor. 
Nevertheless, ending forced labor requires significant penalties 
for state agencies – FARDC, police, etc. – that use forced labor 
as both a mode of punishment and a means of making money. 
Similarly, mechanisms of labor control by mine bosses and crew 
bosses that involve excess charges, debts and threats should be 
addressed. Dealing with these issues involves a combination of 
education, worker empowerment and the development of 
useful, local solutions. There is significant interest among many 
actors in the artisanal mining industry to end the most brutal 
forms of violations, if only because there are clear financial and 
efficiency incentives in doing so. In addition, miners are others 
are strongly motivated by understandings of justice and fairness 
which can be leveraged for a variety of local strategies for 
addressing violations. 
 
Develop alternative governance policies that expand 
engagement with non-state actors – At present, most 
discussions of governance within the artisanal mining industry 
deals with government agencies and, to some degree, with 
government approved cooperatives. However, the actual 
management of artisanal mine sites involve multiple other actors 
such as mine bosses, crew bosses, traditional leaders, traders and 
others. These actors can conceivable play a positive role in 
improving conditions and even in expanding worker 
protections. Certainly their interests and capacity to contribute 
are no less significant that state actors and, in fact, they 
commonly have a greater vested interest in actual mine 
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production. Central to this is a consideration of financial 
incentives which are arguably the primary mobilizing principle 
in the artisanal mining sector in the eastern DRC, for all actors 
involved. Thus, anticipating the financial implications of a 
proposed intervention and how actors are likely to respond will 
be critical in determining the success or otherwise of the policy 
or initiative. Another valuable starting point could be the 
question: in the absence of wider governance reform, what 
existing governance structures or pressure points could be 
leveraged to bring about positive change in the lived experiences 
of Congolese artisanal miners and low-level workers? For 
example, our project revealed the significant role of mine bosses 
and crew bosses as well as traditional leaders and councils of 
elders. Crew bosses and pit owners were implicated in over half 
of violations recorded in the case studies. However, targeting 
this group might yield the greater results in terms of improving 
the day-to-day lives of miners (although it is not clear from the 
research how much room for negotiation the crew bosses and 
pit owners have, often being in debt to people further up the 
supply-chain themselves). The same might be said for traditional 
leaders and local councils of elders who are often viewed as 
repressive players as regards workers’ lives. Yet, their judgment 
on some issues is viewed as more legitimate than that of state 
actors and there may be room to work with these councils as a 
means to improve local governance and justice for miners and 
others. 
 
This study focuses on documenting the lived experience of 
miners and others. This perspective grounds an analysis of the situation 
in the ways in which Congolese manage their direct engagement with 
mining, struggling day to day with the difficulty of the work, the ever 
present dangers, the industry’s constant uncertainty, and the shifting 
nature of earnings. In other words, understanding violations within the 
artisanal mining industry from the perspective of miners and others 
working in the mines such as porters and washers, grounds policy 
analysis in lived experience.  
This has a useful corrective to more abstract analyses such as 
general claims that laws should be respected and the state should govern 
more fairly. That is, there exist a significant number of studies that 
present the answers to the challenge of systematic violations within the 
industry through claims to “end corruption”, “effectively implement 
worker protections”, “ensure appropriate tax collection”, “stop 
smuggling” and similar statements. To a larger degree these claims 
confuse documenting the problems with outlining solutions. While 
violations of labor rights and human rights only make sense by 
grounding the analysis in domestic and international law, it is grossly 
inadequate to suggest that addressing these problems is simply a 
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function of creating a “stronger and more effective state” that acts to 
“fully respect the law”.  
By listening to the voices of miners and considering the 
complexity of local reality, these issues are placed in perspective in a 
manner that illustrates how the artisanal mining industry builds on and 
enables fundamental state weakness, governance incapacity and the 
limited reach and legitimacy of laws and regulatory institutions. It is 
therefore less useful to call for a different type of power structure in the 
region (valuable as that might be for addressing many rights violations) 
and more useful to consider the reality of life on the ground and to 
develop policies that engage Congolese reality as it is. Viewed in a 
different fashion, it is important to engage the complexity of artisanal 
mining in a multi-faceted manner that starts with a basic respect for 
workers and the Congolese people and envisions policy actions as 
diverse, flexible rather than rigid, and structured with an understanding 
of a distinct potential achievements over a reasonable timeline. 
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